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THE INTUITIVE APPEAL
OF EXPLAINABLE MACHINES
Andrew D. Selbst* & Solon Barocas**
Algorithmic decision-making has become synonymous with inexplicable
decision-making, but what makes algorithms so difficult to explain? This
Article examines what sets machine learning apart from other ways of
developing rules for decision-making and the problem these properties pose
for explanation. We show that machine learning models can be both
inscrutable and nonintuitive and that these are related, but distinct,
properties.
Calls for explanation have treated these problems as one and the same,
but disentangling the two reveals that they demand very different responses.
Dealing with inscrutability requires providing a sensible description of the
rules; addressing nonintuitiveness requires providing a satisfying
explanation for why the rules are what they are. Existing laws like the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),
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and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as well as techniques
within machine learning, are focused almost entirely on the problem of
inscrutability. While such techniques could allow a machine learning system
to comply with existing law, doing so may not help if the goal is to assess
whether the basis for decision-making is normatively defensible.
In most cases, intuition serves as the unacknowledged bridge between a
descriptive account and a normative evaluation. But because machine
learning is often valued for its ability to uncover statistical relationships that
defy intuition, relying on intuition is not a satisfying approach. This Article
thus argues for other mechanisms for normative evaluation. To know why
the rules are what they are, one must seek explanations of the process behind
a model’s development, not just explanations of the model itself.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 1087
I. INSCRUTABLE AND NONINTUITIVE ............................................. 1089
A.
B.
C.
D.

Secret .............................................................................. 1091
Requiring Specialized Knowledge .................................. 1093
Inscrutable ...................................................................... 1094
Nonintuitive .................................................................... 1096
II. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO INSCRUTABILITY ..... 1099
A. Legal Requirements for Explanation .............................. 1099
1. FCRA, ECOA, and Regulation B ............................ 1100
2. GDPR ....................................................................... 1106
B. Interpretability in Machine Learning ............................. 1109
1. Purposefully Building Interpretable Models ............ 1110
2. Post Hoc Methods .................................................... 1113
3. Interactive Approaches ............................................ 1115
III. FROM EXPLANATION TO INTUITION ......................................... 1117
A. The Value of Opening the Black Box .............................. 1118
1. Explanation as Inherent Good .................................. 1118
2. Explanation as Enabling Action ............................... 1120
3. Explanation as Exposing a Basis for Evaluation...... 1122
B. Evaluating Intuition ........................................................ 1126
IV. DOCUMENTATION AS EXPLANATION ....................................... 1129
A. The Information Needed to Evaluate Models ................. 1130
B. Providing the Necessary Information ............................. 1133
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1138

2018]

EXPLAINABLE MACHINES

1087

There can be no total understanding and no absolutely reliable test of
understanding.
—Joseph Weizenbaum, “Contextual Understanding by Computers”1

INTRODUCTION
Algorithms increasingly inform consequential decisions about our lives,
with only minimal input from the people they affect and little to no
explanation as to how they work.2 This worries people, and rightly so. The
results of these algorithms can be unnerving,3 unfair,4 unsafe,5
unpredictable,6 and unaccountable.7 How can decision makers who use
algorithms be held to account for their results?
It is perhaps unsurprising that, faced with a world increasingly dominated
by automated decision-making, advocates, policymakers, and legal scholars
would call for machines that can explain themselves.8 People have a natural
1. 10 COMM. ACM 474, 476 (1967). In the 1960s, the project of artificial intelligence
(AI) was largely to mimic human intelligence. Weizenbaum was therefore actually arguing
that computers will never fully understand humans. The purpose of AI research has changed
drastically today, but there is a nice symmetry in the point that humans will never have total
understanding of computers.
2. Aaron M. Bornstein, Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?, NAUTILUS
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-artificial-intelligence-permanentlyinscrutable [http://perma.cc/RW3E-5CPV]; Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI,
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-darksecret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [http://perma.cc/7VYF-5XR7]; Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to
Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/
can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html [http://perma.cc/3CYF-QTVC].
3. See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy,
and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 65–66 (2013); Sara M. Watson, Data
Doppelgängers and the Uncanny Valley of Personalization, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/data-doppelgangers-and-theuncanny-valley-of-personalization/372780/ [http://perma.cc/7J3X-NK3C].
4. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677–92 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 883–89 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data
Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 126–39 (2017).
5. See, e.g., David Lazer et al., The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis,
343 SCIENCE 1203, 1203 (2014); Jennings Brown, IBM Watson Reportedly Recommended
Cancer Treatments That Were ‘Unsafe and Incorrect,’ GIZMODO (July 25, 2018, 3:00 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/ibm-watson-reportedly-recommended-cancer-treatments-tha1827868882 [http://perma.cc/E4RZ-NVZU].
6. See, e.g., Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to
Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51, 57–58 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin
& Ian Kerr eds., 2016) (discussing unpredictability in autonomous systems); Jamie Condliffe,
Algorithms Probably Caused a Flash Crash of the British Pound, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 7,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602586/algorithms-probably-caused-a-flashcrash-of-the-british-pound/ [https://perma.cc/K9FM-6SJE].
7. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18–27 (2014); Joshua A. Kroll et al.,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (2017).
8. See infra Part II.
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feel for explanation. We know how to offer explanations and can often agree
when one is good, bad, in-between, on point, or off topic. Lawyers use
explanation as their primary tradecraft: judges write opinions, administrators
respond to comments, litigators write briefs, and everyone writes memos.
Explanations are the difference between a system that vests authority in
lawful process and one that vests it in an unaccountable person.9
Although we comfortably use explanations, asking someone to define the
concept will often generate a blank look in response. Analytically,
explanation is infinitely variable, and there can be many valid explanations
for a given phenomenon or decision. Thus far, in both law and machine
learning, the scholarly discourse around explanation has primarily revolved
around two questions: Which kinds of explanations are most useful, and
which are technically available?10 Yet, these are the wrong questions or, at
least, the wrong stopping points.
Explanations of technical systems are necessary but not sufficient to
achieve law and policy goals, most of which are concerned not with
explanation for its own sake, but with ensuring that there is a way to evaluate
the basis of decision-making against broader normative constraints such as
antidiscrimination or due process. It is therefore important to ask how
exactly people engage with those machine explanations in order to connect
them to the normative questions of interest to law.
This Article argues that scholars and advocates who seek to use
explanation to enable justification of machine learning models are relying on
intuition to connect the explanation to normative concerns. Intuition is both
powerful and dangerous. While this mode of justifying decision-making
remains important, we must understand the benefits and weaknesses of
connecting machine explanation to intuitions. Remedying the limitations of
intuition requires considering alternatives, which include institutional
processes, documentation, and access to those documents.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the various anxieties
surrounding the use of automated decision-making. After discussing
secrecy, lack of transparency, and lack of technical expertise, Part I argues
that the two distinct, but similar, concepts that truly set machine learning
decision-making apart are inscrutability and nonintuitiveness.
Part II examines laws and machine learning techniques designed
specifically to address the problem of inscrutable decisions. On the legal
side, Part II.A discusses the “adverse action notices” required by federal
credit laws11 and the informational requirements of the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).12 On the technical side, Part
9. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (1995).
10. See infra Part III.
11. This Article will focus on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x,
and Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f.
12. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
(EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
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II.B discusses various techniques used by computer scientists to make
machine learning models interpretable, including designing for simplicity,
approximating complex models in simpler form, extracting the most
important factors in a particular decision, and allowing some degree of
interaction with the models to see how changes in inputs affect outputs.
These techniques can be useful in meeting the requirements of the law, but
such explanations, even when they comply with the law, may be of limited
practical utility.
Part III builds the connection between explanation and intuition before
evaluating the merits of an intuition-centered approach to justification. It
canvasses reasons besides justification that one might want explainable
machines—dignity or autonomy on the one hand and consumer or datasubject education on the other—before concluding that neither is adequate to
fully address the concerns with automated decision-making. Interrogating
the assumptions behind a third reason—that explanation will reveal problems
with the basis for decision-making—demonstrates the reliance on intuition.
The remainder of Part III examines the value and limitations of intuition.
With respect to machine learning in particular, although intuition can root
out obviously good or bad cases, it cannot capture the cases that give machine
learning its greatest value: true patterns that exceed human imagination.
These cases are not obviously right or wrong, but simply strange.
Part IV aims to provide another way. Once outside the black box, all that
is left is to question the process surrounding its development and use. There
are large parts of the process of machine learning that do not show up in a
model but can contextualize its operation, such as paths considered but not
taken and the constraints that influence these choices. Where intuition is
insufficient to determine whether the model’s rules are reasonable or rest on
valid relationships, justification can sometimes be achieved by
demonstrating and documenting due care and thoughtfulness.
I. INSCRUTABLE AND NONINTUITIVE
Scholarly and policy debates about regulating a world controlled by
algorithms have been mired in difficult questions about how to observe,
access, audit, or understand those algorithms.13 The difficulty has been
attributed to a diverse set of problems, specifically that algorithms are

13. See, e.g., Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms, 20
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 14 (2017) (evaluating methods of researching algorithms); Malte
Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 3
(2016); Solon Barocas, Sophie Hood & Malte Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: A Provocation
Piece (Mar. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245322 [https://perma.cc/DB7Z-C9A6]; Nick Seaver, Knowing
Algorithms (Feb. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55eb
004ee4b0518639d59d9b/t/55ece1bfe4b030b2e8302e1e/1441587647177/seaverMiT8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HG3-74U3].

1090

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

“secret”14 and “opaque”15 “black boxes”16 that are rarely, if ever, made
“transparent”;17 that they operate on the basis of correlation rather than
“causality”18 and produce “predictions”19 rather than “explanations”;20 that
their behavior may lack “intelligibility”21 and “foreseeability”;22 and that
they challenge established ways of being “informed”23 or “knowing.”24
These terms are frequently used interchangeably or assumed to have
overlapping meanings. For example, opacity is often seen as a synonym for
secrecy,25 an antonym for transparency,26 and, by implication, an
impediment to understanding.27 Yet the perceived equivalence of these
terms has obscured important differences between distinct problems that
frustrate attempts at regulating algorithms—problems that must be
disentangled before the question of regulation can even be addressed.
This Part argues that many of these challenges are not unique to algorithms
or machine learning. We seek here to parse the problems raised by machine
learning models more precisely and argue that they have little to do with the
fact that their very existence may be unknown, that their inner workings may
be opaque, or that an understanding of their operations may require
specialized knowledge. What sets machine learning models apart from other
decision-making mechanisms are their inscrutability and nonintuitiveness.
14. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 236–37 (2011) (recounting the origins of using trade-secret
protections for algorithms); Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An
Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models
Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 88–90 (2011) (discussing the use of
trade-secret protections for algorithms, which result in lack of transparency concerning
algorithmic decision-making).
15. Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine
Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1, 3–5; Roger Allan Ford & W.
Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2016); Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An
Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision
Making, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 118, 129 (2016).
16. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 8 (2015).
17. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 27; Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent
Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1506.
18. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 4, at 875.
19. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1267–68 (2017).
20. See, e.g., Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation,” 38 AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50,
55.
21. See, e.g., Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1253.
22. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 6, at 52.
23. See, e.g., Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection
Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 89–90 (2017).
24. Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 973, 974–77 (2018).
25. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 15, at 3–4.
26. See, e.g., Ford & Price, supra note 15, at 12; Zarsky, supra note 15, at 124.
27. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 15, at 4–5.
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We adapt and extend a taxonomy first proposed by Jenna Burrell,28 where
our primary purpose is to emphasize these last two properties and clear up
confusion.29 Inscrutability and nonintuitiveness have been conflated in the
past: where the property of inscrutability suggests that models available for
direct inspection may defy understanding, nonintuitiveness suggests that
even where models are understandable, they may rest on apparent statistical
relationships that defy intuition.30
A. Secret
The first common critique of algorithmic decision-making is secrecy.
Secrecy captures two related, but distinct, concerns: (1) secrecy of the
model’s existence and (2) secrecy of its operation.
The first concern is as old as the original Code of Fair Information
Practices (FIPs), the conceptual basis for the majority of privacy laws:31
“There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very
existence is secret.”32 This principle underlies more recent calls to “end
secret profiling” involving algorithms and machine learning, where secrecy
is understood as a purposeful attempt to maintain ignorance of the very fact
of profiling.33
While such worries are particularly pronounced when the government
engages in algorithmic decision-making,34 similar objections arise in the
commercial sector, where there are a remarkable number of scoring systems

28. See generally id.
29. Our parsing of the issues is similar to the taxonomy proposed by Ed Felten in a short
blog post on Freedom to Tinker. Ed Felten, What Does It Mean to Ask for an “Explainable”
Algorithm?, FREEDOM TO TINKER (May 31, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/05/31/
what-does-it-mean-to-ask-for-an-explainable-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/QF7B-RTC6].
30. We intentionally use the term “nonintuitive” rather the word “unintuitive” or
“counterintuitive.” In our view, “unintuitive” implies a result that would not be expected but
is easily understood once explained, and “counterintuitive” suggests a phenomenon that is
opposite one’s expectations. Instead, we intend to refer to a phenomenon about which
intuitive reasoning is not possible.
31. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 56 (2018); Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic
History 3 (Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rgFIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9E-HK9A] (discussing the history of the FIPs).
32. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973),
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG8-FBL9].
In
fact, the newly effective GDPR requires, among other things, disclosure of the “existence” of
an automated decision-making tool. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
33. Algorithmic Transparency: End Secret Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/ZW4W-HKTM] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018); see also Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46
(2015).
34. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262–
70 (2008); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L.
REV. 285, 295–97 (2011).
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of which consumers are simply unaware.35 In many cases, this ignorance
exists because the companies engaged in such scoring are serving other
businesses rather than consumers.36 But the fact that more recent forms of
hidden decision-making involve algorithms or machine learning does not
change the fundamental secrecy objection—that affected parties are not
aware of the existence of the decision-making process.37
The second secrecy concern arises where the existence of a decisionmaking process is known, but its actual operation is not. Affected parties
might be aware that they are subject to such decision-making but have limited
or no knowledge of how the decision-making process works.38 Among the
many terms used to describe this situation, “opacity” seems most apt, as there
is enough visibility to see that the model exists but not enough to discern any
of its details.
While this is perhaps the most frequent critique of algorithms and machine
learning—that their inner workings remain undisclosed or inaccessible39—
it, too, has little to do with the technology specifically. It is an objection to
being subject to a decision where the basis of decision-making remains
secret, which is a situation that can easily occur without algorithms or
machine learning.40
There are sometimes valid reasons for companies to withhold details about
a decision-making process. Where a decision-making process holds financial
and competitive value and where its discovery entails significant investment
or ingenuity, firms may claim protection for its discovery as a trade secret.41
Trade-secret protection applies only when firms purposefully restrict
disclosure of proprietary methods,42 which creates incentives for firms to
maintain secrecy around the basis for decision-making. If the use of
algorithms or machine learning uniquely increases up-front investment or
competitive advantage, then the incentives to restrict access to the details of
35. See PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, THE SCORING OF AMERICA: HOW SECRET
CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 84 (2014),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_
America_April2014_fs.pdf [https://perma.cc/39RJ-97M6].
36. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY i (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokerscall-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527
databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HQY-6WVP].
37. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., supra note 32, at 29
(discussing the lack of awareness of record keeping and use of personal data).
38. This could refer to secrecy around what data is considered or how it is used. See infra
Part II.A for a discussion of these concerns with respect to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
39. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107–08 (2018); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 7, at
10–11. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 16.
40. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407, 1410 (2001) (discussing the private
database industry and corporate decision-making based on consumer data).
41. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 39, at 153–60. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life,
Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1343 (2018).
42. Pasquale, supra note 14, at 237.
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the decision-making process might be understood as peculiar to algorithms
or machine learning. But if other attempts to develop decision-making
processes without algorithms or machine learning involve similar costs and
competitive advantage, then there is nothing special about the relationship
between these technologies, trade secrets, and resistance to disclosure.43
Firms may also reject requests for further details about the basis for
decision-making if they anticipate that such details may enable strategic
manipulation, or “gaming,” of the inputs to the decision-making process.44
If the costs of manipulating one’s characteristics or behavior are lower than
the expected benefits, rational actors would have good incentive to do so.45
Yet these dynamics, too, apply outside algorithms and machine learning; in
the face of some fixed decision procedure, people will find ways to engage
in strategic manipulation. The question is whether decision procedures
developed with machine learning are easier or harder to game than those
developed using other methods—this is not a question that can be answered
in general.
B. Requiring Specialized Knowledge
One common approach to ensuring accountability for software-reliant
decision-making is to require the disclosure of the underlying source code.46
While such disclosure might seem helpful in figuring out how automated
decisions are rendered, the ability to make sense of the disclosed source code
will depend on one’s level of technical literacy. Some minimal degree of
training in computer programming is necessary to read code, although even
that might not be enough.47 The problem, then, is greater than disclosure; in
43. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 139 (2007) (describing the growing application of
trade secrecy in various technologies used in public infrastructure).
44. Jane Bambauer & Tal Z. Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3135949 [http://perma.cc/N62U-3UUK].
45. Whether such manipulation is even possible will vary from case to case, depending
on the degree to which the decision considers immutable characteristics and nonvolitional
behavior. At the same time, it is unclear how easily one could even change the appearance of
one’s characteristics without genuinely changing those characteristics in the process. Altering
behavior to game the system might involve adjustments that actually change a person’s
likelihood of having the sought-after quality or experiencing the event that such behavior is
meant to predict. To the extent that “gaming” is a term used to describe validating rather than
defeating the objectives of a decision system, this outcome should probably not be considered
“gaming” at all. See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 44.
46. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2017); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 647–50; Algorithmic
Transparency: End Secret Profiling, supra note 33. Draft legislation in New York City also
specifically focused on this issue, but the eventual bill convened a more general task force to
consider different approaches. See Jim Dwyer, Showing the Algorithms Behind New York City
Services, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/nyregion/
showing-the-algorithms-behind-new-york-city-services.html [https://perma.cc/38V5-P3EE].
47. Desai & Kroll, supra note 46, at 5 (“[F]undamental limitations on the analysis of
software meaningfully limit the interpretability of even full disclosures of software source
code.”); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 647.
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the absence of the specialized knowledge required to understand source code,
disclosure may offer little value to affected parties and regulators.
As Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford have observed, “Transparency
concerns are commonly driven by a certain chain of logic: observation
produces insights which create the knowledge required to govern and hold
systems accountable.”48 The process of moving from observation to
knowledge to accountability cannot be assumed; in many cases, the ability to
leverage observations for accountability requires preexisting knowledge that
allows observers to appreciate the significance of a disclosure.49
Transparency of systems of decision-making is important, but incomplete.50
But while cultivating the knowledge necessary to read source code requires
time and effort, the problem of expertise—like the problem of secrecy—is
not unique to algorithms.
C. Inscrutable
Rather than programming computers by hand with explicit rules, machine
learning relies on pattern-recognition algorithms and a large set of examples
to uncover relationships in the data that might serve as a reliable basis for
decision-making.51 The power of machine learning lies not only in its ability
to relieve programmers of the difficult task of producing explicit instructions
for computers, but in its capacity to learn subtle relationships in data that
humans might overlook or cannot recognize. This power can render the
models developed with machine learning exceedingly complex and,
therefore, impossible for a human to parse.
We define this difficulty as “inscrutability”—a situation in which the rules
that govern decision-making are so complex, numerous, and interdependent
that they defy practical inspection and resist comprehension. While there is
a long history to such concerns, evidenced most obviously by the term
“byzantine,” the complexity of rules that result from machine learning can
far exceed those of the most elaborate bureaucracy.52 The challenge in such
circumstances is not a lack of awareness, disclosure, or expertise, but the
sheer scope and sophistication of the model.53
Intuitively, complexity would seem to depend on the number of rules
encoded by a model, the length of a rule (i.e., the number of factors that figure
into the rule), and the logical operations involved in the rule. These
properties, however, can be specified more precisely. Four mathematical

48. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 24, at 974.
49. Burrell, supra note 15, at 4.
50. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1254–55 (2008); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 639, 657–60.
51. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 655 (2017).
52. Byzantine,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Byzantine [https://perma.cc/97CM-KNT2] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (defining the term as
“intricately involved”).
53. Burrell, supra note 15, at 4–5.
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properties related to model complexity are linearity, monotonicity,
continuity, and dimensionality.
A linear model is one in which there is a steady change in the value of the
output as the value of the input changes.54 Linear models tend to be easier
for humans to understand and interpret because the relationship between
variables is stable and lends itself to straightforward extrapolation.55 In
contrast, the behavior of nonlinear models can be far more difficult to predict,
even when they involve simple mathematical operations like exponential
growth.56
A monotonic relationship between variables is a relationship that is either
always positive or always negative.57 That is, for every change in input
value, the direction of the corresponding change in output value will remain
Monotonicity aids
consistent, whether an increase or decrease.58
interpretability because it too permits extrapolation and guarantees that the
value of the output only moves in one direction.59 If, however, the value of
the output goes up and down haphazardly as the value of the input moves
steadily upward, the relationship between variables can be difficult to grasp
or predict.
Discontinuous models include relationships where changes in the value of
one variable do not lead to a smooth change in the associated value of
another.60 Discontinuities can render models far less intuitive because they
make it impossible to think in terms of incremental change. A small change
in input may typically lead to small changes in outputs, except for occasional
and seemingly arbitrary large jumps.61
The dimensionality of a model is the number of variables it considers.62
Two-dimensional models are easy to understand because they can be
visualized graphically with a standard plot (with the familiar x and y axes).63
Three-dimensional models also lend themselves to effective visualization (by
adding a z axis), but humans have no way to visualize models with more than
three dimensions.64 While people can grasp relationships between multiple
54. Mathematically, this means that the function is described by a constant slope, which
can be represented by a line. Yin Lou et al., Intelligible Models for Classification and
Regression, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 150, 150 (2012).
55. See id. at 151.
56. Cf. DEMI, ONE GRAIN OF RICE: A MATHEMATICAL FOLKTALE (1997).
57. See Monotonicity Function, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed.
2014).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Continuous Function, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed.
2014) (noting that a continuous function does not suddenly jump at a given point or take
widely differing values arbitrarily close to that point).
61. See Discontinuity, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014).
62. See Dimension (Dimensionality), A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (7th ed.
2016).
63. See Cartesian Plane, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014).
64. See Cartesian Space, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014);
n-Dimensional Space, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014).
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variables without the aid of a graph, we will struggle to understand the full
set of relationships that the model has uncovered as the number of
dimensions grows. The more variables that the model includes, the more
difficult it will be to keep all the interactions between variables in mind and
thus predict how the model would behave given any particular input.65
In describing how these properties of models might frustrate human
understanding, we have relied on terms like intuition, extrapolation, and
prediction. The same cognitive capacity underlies all three: mentally
simulating how a model turns inputs into outputs.66 As computer scientist
Zachary Lipton explains, simulatability—the ability to practically execute a
model in one’s mind—is an important form of understanding a model.67
Such simulations can be either complete or partial. In the former, a person
is able to turn any combination of inputs into the correct outputs, while in the
latter, understanding might be limited to the relationships between a subset
of input and output variables (i.e., how changes in certain inputs affect the
output).
Simulation is a remarkably flat and functional definition of understanding,
but it seems like a minimum requirement for any more elaborate definition.68
This notion of understanding has nothing to say about why the model behaves
the way it does; it is simply a way to account for the facility with which a
person can play out how a model would behave under different
circumstances. When models are too complex for humans to perform this
task, they have reached the point of inscrutability.
D. Nonintuitive
A different line of criticism has developed that takes issue with disclosures
that reveal some basis for decision-making that defies human intuition about
the relevance of certain variables.69 The problem in such cases is not
65. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 51, at 700.
66. Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2016 ICML WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE LEARNING 96, 98 (2016).
67. Id.
68. While we limit our discussion to simulatability, inscrutability is really a broader
concept. In particular, models might be difficult to understand if they consider features or
perform operations that do not have some ready semantic meaning. Burrell, supra note 15, at
10. For example, a deep-learning algorithm can learn on its own which features in an image
are characteristic of different objects (the standard example being cats). Bornstein, supra note
2. Part III.A.3, infra, returns to one such example that involves distinguishing between wolves
and huskies. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. An algorithm will usually learn
to detect edges that differentiate an object from its background, but it might also engineer
features on its own that have no equivalent in human cognition and therefore defy description.
See Lipton, supra note 66, at 98 (discussing decomposability). This aspect of inscrutability,
however, is of slightly less concern for this Article. Most methods that are common in the
kinds of applications that apportion important opportunities (e.g., credit) involve features that
have been handcrafted by experts in the domain (e.g., length of employment) and accordingly
will usually not face this problem. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
69. Deborah Gage, Big Data Uncovers Some Weird Correlations, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23,
2014, 4:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-data-helps-companies-find-somesurprising-correlations-1395168255 [https://perma.cc/8KYB-LP9W]; Quentin Hardy,
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inscrutability, but an inability to weave a sensible story to account for the
statistical relationships in the model.70 Although the statistical relationship
that serves as the basis for decision-making might be readily identifiable, that
relationship may defy intuitive expectations about the relevance of certain
criteria to the decision.71 As Paul Ohm explains:
We are embarking on the age of the impossible-to-understand reason, when
marketers will know which style of shoe to advertise to us online based on
the type of fruit we most often eat for breakfast, or when the police know
which group in a public park is most likely to do mischief based on the way
they do their hair or how far from one another they walk.72

Even though it is clear which statistical relationships serve as the basis for
decision-making in this case, why such statistical relationships exist is
mystifying. This is a crucial and consistent point of confusion. The demand
for intuitive relationships is not the demand for disclosure or accessible
explanations; it is a demand that decision-making rely on reasoning that
comports with intuitive understanding of the phenomenon in question. In
social science, similar expectations are referred to as “face validity”—the
subjective sense that some measure is credible because it squares with our
existing understanding of the phenomenon.73 While such demands are not
unique to algorithms and machine learning, the fact that such computational
tools are designed to uncover relationships that defy human intuition explains
why the problem will be particularly pronounced in these cases.
Critics have pinned this problem on the use of “[m]ere correlation”74 in
machine learning, which frees it to uncover reliable, if incidental,
relationships in the data that can then serve as the basis for consequential
decision-making.75 Despite being framed as an indictment of correlational
analysis, however, it is really an objection to decision-making that rests on
particular correlations that defy familiar causal stories76—even though these
stories may be incorrect.77 This has led to the mistaken belief that forcing

Bizarre Insights from Big Data, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Mar. 28, 2012, 8:17 PM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/bizarre-insights-from-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/
GKW2-KN8T].
70. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1280–97.
71. See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1318 (2012).
72. Id.
73. See generally Ronald R. Holden, Face Validity, in 2 CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PSYCHOLOGY 637 (Irving B. Weiner & W. Edward Craighead eds., 4th ed. 2010).
74. Kim, supra note 4, at 875, 883.
75. Id.; see also James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible
Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 173 (2016).
76. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1280–97.
77. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 199–200 (2011) (discussing the
“narrative fallacy”); id. at 224 (“Several studies have shown that human decision makers are
inferior to a prediction formula even when they are given the score suggested by the formula!
They feel that they can overrule the formula because they have additional information about
the case, but they are wrong more often than not.”).
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decision-making to rest on causal mechanisms rather than mere correlations
will ensure intuitive models.78
Causal relationships can be exceedingly complex and nonintuitive,
especially when dealing with human behavior.79 Indeed, causal relationships
uncovered through careful experimentation can be as elaborate and
unexpected as the kinds of correlations uncovered in historical data with
machine learning.80 If we consider all the different factors that cause a
person to take an action—mood, amount of sleep, food consumption, rational
choice, and many other things—it quickly becomes clear that causality is not
particularly straightforward.81 The only advantage of models that rely on
causal mechanisms in such cases would be the reliability of their predictions
(because the models would be deterministic rather than probabilistic), not the
ability to interrogate whether the identified causal relationships comport with
human intuitions and values. Given that much of the interest in causality
stems from an unwillingness to simply defer to predictive accuracy as a
justification for models, improved reliability will not be a satisfying answer.
*

*

*

The demand for intuitive relationships reflects a desire to ensure that there
is a way to assess whether the basis of decision-making is sound, as a matter
of validity and as a normative matter. We want to be able to do more than
simply simulate a model; we want to be able to evaluate it. One way to
ensure this possibility is to force a model to rely exclusively on features that
bear a manifest relationship to the outcome of interest, on the belief that welljustified decisions are those that rest on relationships that conform to familiar
and permissible patterns.
Achieving this type of intuitiveness requires addressing inscrutability as a
starting point. An understandable model is necessary because there can be
nothing intuitive about a model that resists all interrogation. But addressing
inscrutability is not sufficient. A simple, straightforward model might still
defy intuition if it has not been constrained to only use variables with an
intuitive relationship to the outcome.82
78. These critiques also presume that causal mechanisms that exhaustively account for the
outcomes of interest actually exist (e.g., performance on the job, default, etc.), yet certain
phenomena might not be so deterministic; extrinsic random factors may account for some of
the difference in the outcomes of interest. Jake M. Hofman, Amit Sharma & Duncan J. Watts,
Prediction and Explanation in Social Systems, 355 SCIENCE 486, 488 (2017).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Attempts to model causation require limiting the features considered as potential
causes because, to a certain extent, almost any preceding event could conceivably be causally
related to the later one. JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE 401–
28 (2d ed. 2009).
82. See, e.g., Jiaming Zeng, Berk Ustun & Cynthia Rudin, Interpretable Classification
Models for Recidivism Prediction, 180 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 689 (2017). Note that in this
and related work, the researchers limit themselves to features that are individually and
intuitively related to the outcome of interest. See id. at 693–97. If these methods begin with
features that do not have such a relationship, the model might be simple enough to inspect but
too strange to square with intuition. See infra Part III.B.
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Insisting on intuitive relationships is not the only way to make a model
evaluable. To the extent that intuitiveness is taken to be an end in itself rather
than a particular means to the end of ensuring sound decision-making, its
proponents risk overlooking other, potentially more effective, ways to
achieve the same goal. The remainder of this Article considers the different
paths we might take to use explanations of machine learning models to
regulate them.
II. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO INSCRUTABILITY
This moment is not the first time that law and computer science have
attempted to address algorithmic decision-making with explanation
requirements. Credit scoring has long been regulated, in part, by requiring
“adverse action notices,” which explain adverse decisions to consumers.83 In
Europe, concern about automated decisions has been a neglected part of data
protection law for more than two decades, with interest in them reinvigorated
On the machine learning side, the subfield of
by the GDPR.84
“interpretability”—within which researchers have been attempting to find
ways to understand complex models—is over thirty years old.85
What seems to emerge from the law and computer science is a focus on
two kinds of explanation. The first concerns accounting for outcomes—how
particular inputs lead to a particular output. The second concerns the logic
of decision-making—full or partial descriptions of the rules of the system.
This Part reviews the legal and technical approaches to outcome and logicbased explanations.
A. Legal Requirements for Explanation
Though much of the current concern over inscrutable systems stems from
the growing importance of machine learning, inscrutable systems predate this
technique. As a result, regulations that require certain systems to explain
themselves already exist. This section discusses two examples of legal
systems and strategies that rely on different types of explanations: credit
reporting statutes, which rely on outcome-based explanations, and the
GDPR, which mandates logic-based explanations. Credit scoring predates
machine learning, and is governed by two statutes: the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA)86 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).87 Statistical
credit-scoring systems take information about consumers as inputs, give the
83. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
84. See Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, art. 3(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC) [hereinafter Data
Protection Directive].
85. See, e.g., William van Melle, Edward H. Shortliffe & Bruce G. Buchanan, EMYCIN:
A Knowledge Engineer’s Tool for Constructing Rule-Based Expert Systems, in RULE-BASED
EXPERT SYSTEMS: THE MYCIN EXPERIMENT OF THE STANFORD HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING
PROJECT 302 (Bruce G. Buchanan & Edward H. Shortliffe eds., 1984).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012).
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inputs certain point values, add them to obtain a total score, and then make
decisions based on that score. Each of these statutes require “adverse action
notices” that must include a statement of reasons for denials of credit or other
credit-based outcomes.88 This is an example of what we call outcome-based
explanations: a description of the facts that proved relevant to a decision, but
not a description of the decision-making rules themselves.
Articles 13–15 of the GDPR require data subjects to have access to
“meaningful information about the logic involved” in any automated
decision-making that significantly affects them.89 As the law is still new, the
import and proper interpretation of this requirement remain unclear. In
advance of a definitive interpretation, the GDPR appears to ask for a
functional description of the model—enough of a description of the rules
governing decision-making such that a data subject can vindicate her
substantive rights under the GDPR and human rights laws.90 This is an
example of logic-based explanations: a description of the reasoning behind
a decision, not just the relevant inputs to the decision.
1. FCRA, ECOA, and Regulation B
The most straightforward legal requirement to explain inscrutable
decision-making is the adverse action notice. In 1970, Congress passed
FCRA91 to begin to rein in the unregulated credit industry. FCRA was “the
first information privacy legislation in the United States.”92 It limits to whom
and for what purposes credit reports can be disclosed,93 allows consumers
access to their credit reports,94 and requires credit reporting agencies
(CRAs)—for example, Experian, Transunion, and Equifax—to employ
procedures to ensure accuracy and govern dispute resolution.95 FCRA was
not initially concerned with how decisions were made, but rather with the
then-new phenomenon of amassing large quantities of information.96 Four
years later, however, Congress passed ECOA97 and took aim at the decision88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1691d(2).
89. GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13(f)(2), 14(g)(2), 15(1)(h) (requiring access to
“meaningful information about the logic” of automated decisions).
90. See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to
Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233, 236 (2017). There is a vigorous debate in the
literature about the “right to explanation” in the GDPR. See infra notes 143–45 and
accompanying text. As a discussion of positive law, this debate is connected to, but different
than, the point we seek to make about the GDPR—that it is one example of a law that operates
by asking for the logic of a system. Even if there is held to be no “right to explanation” in the
GDPR, one could imagine an equivalent law that encodes such a requirement.
91. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)).
92. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 101 (1995).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
94. Id. § 1681g.
95. Id. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i.
96. 115 CONG. REC. 2410 (1969).
97. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012)).
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making process.98 ECOA prohibits discrimination in credit decisions on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age (for
adults), receipt of public assistance income, or exercise in good faith of the
rights guaranteed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.99
ECOA introduced the adverse action notice requirement.100 When a
creditor takes an adverse action against an applicant, the creditor must give a
statement of “specific reasons” for the denial.101 When FCRA later adopted
a similar requirement, it expanded the notice to cover uses of credit
information beyond decisions made by creditors, including the use of such
information in employment decisions.102
ECOA’s notice requirement was implemented by the Federal Reserve
Board via Regulation B,103 which mandates that the “statement of reasons . . .
must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse
action.”104 The regulation also notes that it is insufficient to “state[] that the
adverse action was based on the creditor’s internal standards or policies or
that the applicant . . . failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor’s
credit scoring system.”105 An appendix to Regulation B offers a sample
notification form designed to satisfy both the rule’s and FCRA’s notification
requirements. Sample Form 1 offers twenty-four reason codes, including
such varied explanations as “no credit file,” “length of employment,” or
“income insufficient for amount of credit requested.”106 Though it is not
98. Id. § 502, 88 Stat. at 1521 (noting that the purpose of the legislation is to ensure credit
is extended fairly, impartially, and without regard to certain protected classes).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
100. Id. § 1691(d)(2)(B); Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s
Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73,
82 (1980) (“For the first time, federal legislation afforded rejected credit applicants an
automatic right to discover why adverse action was taken.”).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)–(3).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2012).
103. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1002.1–.16 (2018).
104. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (2018).
105. Id.
106. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, app. C (2018). The form’s listed options are:
__Credit application incomplete
__Insufficient number of credit references provided
__Unacceptable type of credit references provided
__Unable to verify credit references
__Temporary or irregular employment
__Unable to verify employment
__Length of employment
__Income insufficient for amount of credit requested
__Excessive obligations in relation to income
__Unable to verify income
__Length of residence
__Temporary residence
__Unable to verify residence
__No credit file
__Limited credit experience
__Poor credit performance with us
__Delinquent past or present credit obligations with others
__Collection action or judgment
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necessary to use the form, most creditors tend to report reasons contained on
that form because there is a safe harbor for “proper use” of the form.107
Adverse action notices aim to serve three purposes: (1) to alert a consumer
that an adverse action has occurred;108 (2) to educate the consumer about how
such a result could be changed in the future;109 and (3) to prevent
discrimination.110 As the rest of this section will show, these are commonly
cited reasons for relying on explanations as a means of regulation as a general
matter. The first rationale, consumer awareness, is straightforward enough.
It is a basic requirement of any information-regulation regime that consumers
be aware of systems using their information.111 But the relationship between
adverse action notices and the other two rationales—consumer education and
antidiscrimination—requires further exploration.
Adverse action notices can be helpful for consumer education. As Winnie
Taylor pointed out shortly after the passage of ECOA, some reasons—“no
credit file” and “unable to verify income”—are self-explanatory and would
allow a consumer to take appropriate actions to adjust.112 Conversely, some
explanations, such as “length of employment” and home ownership, are
harder to understand or act on.113 This suggests that an explanation of a
specific decision may be informative, but it may not reveal an obvious path
to an alternative outcome.
There are also situations in which it may not even be informative. Taylor
imagined a hypothetical additive credit-scoring system with eight different
features—including whether an applicant owns or rents, whether he has a
home phone, and what type of occupation he has, among other things—each
assigned different point values.114 In a system like that, someone who comes
up one point short could find himself with every factor listed as a “principal
__Garnishment or attachment
__Foreclosure or repossession
__Bankruptcy
__Number of recent inquiries on credit bureau report
__Value or type of collateral not sufficient
__Other, specify: _________

Id.
107. Equal Credit Opportunity, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,590, 41,592 (July 15, 2011) (“A creditor
receives a safe harbor for compliance with Regulation B for proper use of the model forms.”).
108. See S. REP. NO. 94-589, at 4 (1976).
109. Id. (“[R]ejected credit applicants will now be able to learn where and how their credit
status is deficient and this information should have a pervasive and valuable educational
benefit. Instead of being told only that they do not meet a particular creditor’s standards,
consumers particularly should benefit from knowing, for example, that the reason for the
denial is their short residence in the area, or their recent change of employment, or their already
over-extended financial situation.”).
110. Id. (“The requirement that creditors give reasons for adverse action is . . . a strong and
necessary adjunct to the antidiscrimination purpose of the legislation, for only if creditors
know they must explain their decisions will they effectively be discouraged from
discriminatory practices.”).
111. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
112. Taylor, supra note 100, at 97.
113. Id. at 95.
114. Id. at 105–07.
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reason”115 for the denial. In one sense, this must be correct because a positive
change in any factor at all would change the outcome. In another sense,
however, choosing arbitrarily among equivalently valid reasons runs counter
to the instruction to give specific and actionable notice.
Taylor also described a real system from that era, complex in all the
various ways described in Part I—nonlinear, nonmonotonic, discontinuous,
and multidimensional:
[A]pplicants who have lived at their present address for less than six months
are awarded 39 points, a level which they could not reach again until they
had maintained the same residence for seven and one-half years.
Furthermore, applicants who have been residents for between six months
and 1 year 5 months (30 points) are considered more creditworthy than
those who have been residents for between 1 and 1/2 years and 3 years 5
months (27 points).116

If the creditor tried to explain these rules simply, it would leave information
out, but if the creditor were to explain in complete detail, it would likely
overwhelm a credit applicant. This is an equivalent problem to simply
disclosing how a model works under the banner of transparency; access to
the model is not the same as understanding.117
The Federal Reserve Board recognized this problem, observing that,
although all the principal reasons must be disclosed, “disclosure of more than
four reasons is not likely to be helpful to the applicant.”118 The difficulty is
that there will be situations where complexity cannot be avoided in a faithful
representation of the scoring system, and listing factors alone will fail to
accurately explain the decision, especially when the list is limited to four.119
It is worth noting that modern credit systems appear not to be based on such
complex models,120 likely due to the very existence of FCRA and ECOA.
Credit predictions tend to rely on features that bear an intuitive relationship
to default, such as past payment history.121 But the point is more general:
115. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
116. Taylor, supra note 100, at 123.
117. See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 24, at 979 (“Transparency can intentionally
occlude.”).
118. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I, para. 9(b)(2) (2018). FCRA later codified the same
limitation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(1)(C) (2012).
119. The document also states that the “specific reasons . . . must relate to and accurately
describe the factors actually considered or scored by a creditor . . . . A creditor need not
describe how or why a factor adversely affected an applicant . . . . If a creditor bases the . . .
adverse action on a credit scoring system, the reasons disclosed must relate only to those
factors actually scored in the system.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I, para. 9(b)(2).
120. Patrick Hall, Wen Phan & SriSatish Ambati, Ideas on Interpreting Machine Learning,
O’REILLY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/ideas-on-interpreting-machinelearning [https://perma.cc/57XK-NU7G].
121. Carol A. Evans, Keeping Fintech Fair: Thinking About Fair Lending and UDAP
Risks, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (Fed. Res. Sys., Phila., Pa.), 2017, at 4–5,
https://consumercomplianceoutlook.org/assets/2017/second-issue/ccoi22017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52XP-PQN4]; see also ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA,
UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 21 (2014),
https://www.teamupturn.com/static/files/Knowing_the_Score_Oct_2014_v1_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FCY-4K2K].
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approaches based on giving specific reasons for outcomes can fail where the
system is too complex.
The adverse action notice fares worse as an antidiscrimination measure.
By 1974, forcing hidden intentions into the open was a common technique
for addressing discrimination.122 Just one year before ECOA’s passage,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green123 laid out the canonical Title VII
burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment, which requires a
defendant to rebut a prima facie case of employment discrimination with a
nondiscriminatory reason and gives plaintiffs a chance to prove that the
proffered reason is pretextual.124 Just two years before that, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.125 recognized disparate impact
doctrine.126 Disparate impact attributes liability for a facially neutral
decision that has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class unless
the decision maker can provide a legitimate business reason for the decision
and no equally effective but less discriminatory alternative exists.127 Its
initial purpose was arguably to smoke out intentional discrimination where
intent was hidden.128 Thus, ECOA pursued the same goal—to prevent
discrimination by forcing decision-making into the open.
While forcing stated reasons into the open captures the most egregious
forms of intentional discrimination, it does not capture much else. Although,
in some cases, Regulation B bars collection of protected-class information,129
race, gender, and other features can be reliably inferred from sufficiently rich
Should creditors seek to discriminate intentionally by
datasets.130
considering membership in a protected class, they would have to
affirmatively lie about such behavior lest they reveal obvious wrongdoing.
This form of intentional discrimination is thus addressed by disclosure.
Should creditors rely on known proxies for membership in a protected class,
however, while they would have to withhold the true relevance of these
features in predicting creditworthiness, they could cite them honestly as
reasons for the adverse action. The notice requirement therefore does not
place meaningful constraints on creditors, nor does it create additional or

122. See Olatunde C. A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 125, 140 (2014) (tracing the history of agency use of disparate impact analysis to
address latent discrimination).
123. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
124. Id. at 805. The Supreme Court later found that a jury may presume that if all the
employer had was pretext, that itself is evidence of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”).
125. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
126. Id. at 431.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012). This description ignores the word “refuse” in
the statute, but is probably the more common reading. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 709.
128. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 494, 518–21 (2003) (discussing the “evidentiary dragnet” theory of disparate impact).
129. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5 (2018).
130. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 692.
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unique liability beyond that present in the antidiscrimination provisions of
the rest of the regulation.131
More importantly, creditors using quantitative methods that do not
expressly consider protected-class membership are likely not engaged in
intentional discrimination, yet the scoring systems might very well evince a
disparate impact. While ECOA does not expressly provide for a disparate
impact theory of discrimination, case law suggests that it is very likely
available.132
The adverse action notice approach has two specific shortcomings for a
disparate impact case. First, when reviewing such a notice, the consumer
only has access to her own specific outcome. Her single point of reference
does not provide any understanding of the frequency of denials along
protected-class lines, so she cannot observe disparate impact. Absent
understanding of the logic of the system—for example, how different inputs
are weighted—she cannot even look at the decision-making to try to guess
whether it is discriminatory; the notice simply provides no basis to bring a
suit.
Second, disparate impact has a different relationship to reasons behind
decisions than does intentional discrimination. While for intentional
discrimination, a consumer only needs to know that the decision was not
made for an improper reason, knowing the specific reasons for which it was
made becomes important for a disparate impact case.133 That is to say, it is
not only important to understand how a statistical system converts inputs to
specific outputs, but also why the system was set up that way.
As discussed in Part I, one avenue to ensure the existence of an explanation
of why the rules are the way they are is to require that the rules be based on
intuitive relationships between input and output variables. This is the
approach advocated by several scholars, particularly those focused on
discrimination.134 As is discussed in Part IV, it is not the only way, but this
inability to engage with the normative purposes of the statute is a clear
shortcoming of explanations based solely on the outcome of a single case,
which provides neither the logic of the system nor any information about its
normative elements.

131. John H. Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: A Functional Failure, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 388 (1984).
132. The Supreme Court has not ruled that it is available, but most circuit courts that have
considered it have permitted it. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the
Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 193 (2016) (citing Golden v. City of Columbus,
404 F.3d 950, 963 (6th Cir. 2005)). In addition, the Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that disparate
impact theory was cognizable in the Fair Housing Act, which also does not expressly provide
for it. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2518 (2015).
133. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 702.
134. See infra Part III.A.3.
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2. GDPR
In 2016, the European Union (EU) passed the GDPR, which took effect on
May 25, 2018, and replaced the 1995 Data Protection Directive.135 Both laws
regulate automated decision-making,136 but in the twenty-three years of the
Directive’s existence, little jurisprudence developed around that particular
aspect of the law. The GDPR has created renewed interest in these
provisions.137
The GDPR’s discussion of automated decisions is contained in Articles
22, 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h). Article 22 is the primary provision and
states, in relevant part, the following:
1. The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision:
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the
data subject and a data controller;
(b) . . .
(c) is based on the data subject’s explicit consent.
3. In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data
controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point
of view and to contest the decision.138

Articles 13–15 spell out a data subject’s right to be informed about the
information that data controllers have about her.139 Articles 13 and 14
describe the obligations of data controllers to affirmatively notify data
subjects about the uses of their information,140 and Article 15 delineates the
access rights that data subjects have to information about how their own data
is used.141 All three demand that the following information be available to
data subjects: “the existence of automated decision-making, including
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases,
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance
and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.”142

135. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 99.
136. Id. art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”); Data Protection
Directive, supra note 84, art. 15.
137. Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions
Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW 77, 80–81 (2017).
138. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 22. Article 22(4) is omitted because it is not relevant to
this discussion.
139. Wachter et al., supra note 23, at 89.
140. See GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13–14.
141. See id. art. 15.
142. Id. arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h).
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Since passage of the GDPR, scholars have debated whether these
requirements amount to a “right to explanation.”143 As one of us has argued
elsewhere, that debate has been bogged down in proxy battles over what the
phrase “right to explanation” means, but no matter whether one calls it a right
to explanation, requiring that data subjects have meaningful information
about the logic must mean something related to explanation.144 Importantly
for this discussion, the Regulation demands that the “meaningful
information” must be about the logic of the decisions.145 As we defined it in
Part I, a model is inscrutable when it defies practical inspection and resists
comprehension. An explanation of the logic therefore appears to precisely
target inscrutability. The most important aspect of this type of explanation
is that it is concerned with the operation of the model in general, rather than
as it pertains to a particular outcome.
The particular type of explanation required by the GDPR will depend on
the legal standards developed in the EU by the authorities charged with
interpreting that law. The overall purposes of the GDPR are much broader
than FCRA and ECOA. The EU treats data protection as a fundamental
right,146 and the GDPR seeks to vindicate the following principles with
respect to personal data: lawfulness, fairness, and transparency; purpose
limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and
confidentiality; and accountability.147 Several of these principles are a
restatement of the FIPs that have shaped privacy policy for decades.148
143. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 17–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3196985 [https://perma.cc/92GH-W6HV] (reviewing the literature);
see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to an
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
18, 44 (2017) (arguing that even if a right to explanation exists, it may not be useful);
Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated DecisionMaking Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 245,
250 (2017) (arguing that the GDPR creates a right to “legibility” that combines transparency
and comprehensibility); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 137 (arguing that a right to
explanation can be derived as a necessary precursor to the right to contest the decision); Selbst
& Powles, supra note 90 (arguing that a right to meaningful information is a right to
explanation); Sandra Wachter et al., Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black
Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH 841 (2018) (arguing that a
legal right to explanations of automated decisions does not exist); Wachter et al., supra note
23 (arguing that there is no legal right to explanation of specific automated decisions);
Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 20, at 2 (arguing that a right to explanation exists); Maja
Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic Decision-Making and Data Protection
in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond 15 (Aug. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124901 [https://perma.cc/C9PN-4PL6]
(arguing that “information about the logic involved” and the right to contest decisions imply
a right to explanation).
144. See Selbst & Powles, supra note 90, at 233.
145. GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h).
146. Id. art. 1.
147. Id. art. 5.
148. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 106–07 (2014). While different
lists of FIPs conflict, one prominent example is the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development’s (OECD) list: Collection Limitation Principle, Data Quality Principle,
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Considered as a whole, they begin to sound like the general idea of due
process in all its expansiveness.
Satisfying this requirement may in some cases involve disclosing the full
set of rules behind all decision-making—that is, the entire model.149 But in
some cases, it will not involve such radical disclosure. Depending on the
specific goals at issue, the types of rules disclosed can be narrower, or the
explanation can perhaps be met interactively by providing data subjects with
the tools to examine how changes in their information relate to changes in
outcome. One of us has argued that the GDPR’s meaningful information
requirement applies “to the data subject herself”150 and “should be
interpreted functionally and flexibly,” and that the legal standard should be
that the explanation “at a minimum, enable[s] a data subject to exercise his
or her rights under the GDPR and human rights law.”151
Although the GDPR’s goals are broader than those of ECOA and FCRA,
evaluating the ability of logic-based explanations to vindicate the goals of
those statutes can demonstrate how explanations of the logic of decisionmaking can improve upon the shortcomings of the outcome-based approach.
The three reasons were awareness, consumer (here, data subject) education,
and antidiscrimination.152 Like in the credit domain, awareness is
straightforward and encapsulated by the requirement that a data subject be
made aware of the “existence” of automated decision-making. The other two
rationales operate differently when logic-based explanations are provided.
Data subject education becomes more straightforward as a legal matter, if
not a technical one. Absent inscrutability, a data subject would be told the
rules of the model and would be able to comprehend his situation and how to
achieve any particular outcome. This solves both problems that Taylor
identified.153 Consider the system where, after the creditor totaled the point
values from eight factors, a person missed on her credit application by one
point. While it might be impossible to point to four factors that were
“principal reasons,” the explanation of the logic—what the eight factors
were, that they were all assigned point values, and that the hypothetical
applicant just missed by a point—would be much more useful to that
Purpose Specification Principle, Use Limitation Principle, Security Safeguards Principle,
Openness Principle, Individual Participation Principle, and Accountability Principle. Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The OECD Privacy Framework, at 14–15 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWM2EUD4].
149. The guidelines issued by the Article 29 Working Party, a body tasked with giving
official interpretations of EU law, states that the full model is not required. See Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and
Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 25, WP 251 (Feb. 6, 2018) (“The GDPR
requires the controller to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, not
necessarily a complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.”).
As a matter of positive law, then, this is likely to be the outcome, but in some cases it may fall
short of something actually meaningful to the data subject.
150. See Selbst & Powles, supra note 90, at 236.
151. Id. at 233.
152. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
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particular rejected applicant.154 In Taylor’s real nonlinear, nonmonotonic,
discontinuous, and multidimensional example, the full complexity can be
appreciated in the paragraph-long description, where a reason code would in
many cases be totally unhelpful. Once machine learning enters the picture,
and models become more complex, the limits on technical ability to solve
inscrutability may prevent these explanations from coming to fruition. But at
least in theory, explanations of the logic are sufficient for data subject
education.
Turning to discrimination—which serves as a stand-in for broader
normative questions about model justification—while logic-based
explanations do fare better than outcome-based ones, they do not completely
address the shortcomings. Any rule that is manifestly objectionable becomes
visible under logic-based explanations, making them an improvement over
outcome-only explanations, which shed no light on rules. This disclosure
might enable one to speculate if facially neutral rules will nevertheless have
a disparate impact, based on the different rates at which certain input features
are held across the population. But this is ultimately little more than
guesswork.155 Although there might not be anything about a rule that appears
likely to generate a disparate impact, it still could. Alternatively, a set of
rules could appear objectionable or discriminatory, but ultimately be
justified. It will often be impossible to tell without more information, and
the possibility of happening on a set of rules that lend themselves to intuitive
normative assessment is only a matter of chance.
B. Interpretability in Machine Learning
The overriding question that has prompted fierce debates about
explanation and machine learning has been whether machine learning can be
made to comply with the law. As discussed in Part I, machine learning poses
unique challenges for explanation and understanding—and thus challenges
for meeting the apparent requirements of the law. Part II.A further
demonstrated that even meeting the requirements of the law does not
automatically provide the types of explanations that would be necessary to
assess whether decisions are well justified. Nevertheless, addressing the
potential inscrutability of machine learning models remains a fundamental
step in meeting this goal.
As it happens, machine learning has a well-developed toolkit to deal with
calls for explanation. There is an extensive literature on “interpretability.”156
Early research recognized and grappled with the challenge of explaining the
decisions of machine learning models such that people using these systems

154. The Article 29 Working Party has, however, suggested that this approach is central to
the “meaningful information” requirement. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
supra note 149, at 25.
155. See infra Part III.A.3.
156. See generally, e.g., Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black
Box Models, 51 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, Aug. 2018, at 1; Lipton, supra note 66.
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would feel comfortable acting upon them.157 Practitioners and researchers
have developed a wide variety of strategies and techniques to ensure that they
can produce interpretable models from data—many of which may be useful
for complying with existing law, such as FCRA, ECOA, and the GDPR.
Interpretability has received considerable attention in research and practice
due to the widely held belief that there is a tension between how well a model
will perform and how well humans will be able to interpret it.158 This view
reflects the reasonable idea that models that consider a larger number of
variables, a larger number of relationships between these variables, and a
more diverse set of potential relationships is likely to be both more accurate
and more complex.159 This will certainly be the case when the phenomenon
that machine learning seeks to model is itself complex. This intuition
suggests that practitioners may face a difficult choice: favor simplicity for
the sake of interpretability or accept complexity to maximize performance.160
While such views seem to be widely held,161 over the past decade, methods
have emerged that attempt to sidestep these difficult choices altogether,
promising to increase interpretability while retaining performance.162
Researchers have developed at least three different ways to respond to the
demand for explanations: (1) purposefully orchestrating the machine
learning process such that the resulting model is interpretable;163
(2) applying special techniques after model creation to approximate the
model in a more readily intelligible form or identify features that are most
salient for specific decisions;164 and (3) providing tools that allow people to
interact with the model and get a sense of its operation.165
1. Purposefully Building Interpretable Models
Practitioners have a number of different levers at their disposal to
purposefully design simpler models. First, they may choose to consider only
a limited set of all possible variables.166 By limiting the analysis to a smaller
set of variables, the total number of relationships uncovered in the learning
process might be sufficiently limited to be intelligible to a human.167 It is
157. van Melle et al., supra note 85, at 302.
158. See, e.g., Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures, 16 STAT. SCI. 199,
206 (2001); Lou et al., supra note 54, at 150.
159. See Breiman, supra note 158, at 208.
160. See generally id.
161. See DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT:
EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (XAI) (2016), https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/
DARPA-BAA-16-53.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FZV-TZGA]; Henrik Brink & Joshua Bloom,
Overcoming the Barriers to Production-Ready Machine-Learning Workflows, STRATA (Feb.
11, 2014), https://conferences.oreilly.com/strata/strata2014/public/schedule/detail/32314
[https://perma.cc/2GBV-2QRR].
162. For a recent survey, see Michael Gleicher, A Framework for Considering
Comprehensibility in Modeling, 4 BIG DATA 75 (2016).
163. See, e.g., id. at 81–82.
164. See, e.g., id. at 82–83.
165. See, e.g., id. at 83.
166. See id. at 81.
167. Zeng et al., supra note 82, at 690–91.
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very likely that a model with five features, for example, will be more
interpretable than a model with five hundred.
Second, practitioners might elect to use a learning method that outputs a
model that can be more easily parsed than the output of other learning
methods.168 For example, decision tree algorithms are perceived as likely to
produce interpretable models because they learn nested rules that can be
represented visually as a tree with subdividing branches. To understand how
the model would process any particular case, practitioners need only walk
through the relevant branches of the tree; to understand the model overall,
practitioners can explore all the branches to develop a sense of how the model
would determine all possible cases.
The experience of applying machine learning to real-world problems has
led to common beliefs among practitioners about the relative interpretability
of models that result from different learning methods and how well they
perform. Conventional wisdom suggests that there is a trade-off between
interpretability and accuracy.169 Methods like linear regression170 generate
models perceived as highly interpretable, but relatively low performing,
while methods like deep learning171 result in high-performing models that
are exceedingly difficult to interpret.172 While researchers have pointed out
that such comparisons do not rest on a rigorous definition of interpretability
or empirical studies,173 such beliefs routinely guide practitioners’ decisions
when applying machine learning to different kinds of problems.174
Another method is to set the parameters of the learning process to ensure
that the resulting model is not so complex that it defies human
comprehension. For example, even decision trees will become unwieldy for
humans if they involve an exceedingly large number of branches and
leaves.175 Practitioners routinely set an upper bound on the number of leaves
to constrain the complexity of the model.176 For decades, practitioners in
regulated industries like credit and insurance have purposefully limited
themselves to a relatively small set of features and less sophisticated learning
methods.177 In so doing, they have been able to generate models that lend
themselves to sensible explanation, but they may have forgone the increased
accuracy that would result from a richer and more advanced analysis.178

168. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 51, at 688–95.
169. See, e.g., Breiman, supra note 158, at 208.
170. See Regression, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014).
171. See generally Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An
Overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85 (2015) (providing an explanation of deep learning in
artificial intelligence).
172. Breiman, supra note 158, at 206.
173. Alex A. Freitas, Comprehensible Classification Models—a Position Paper,
15 SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS, June 2013, at 1.
174. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 99.
175. Id. at 98.
176. See id. at 99.
177. Hall et al., supra note 120.
178. Id.
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Linear models remain common in industry because they allow companies
to much more readily comply with the law.179 When they involve a
sufficiently small set of features, linear models are concise enough for a
human to grasp the relevant statistical relationships and to simulate different
scenarios.180 They are simple enough that a full description of the model
may amount to the kind of meaningful information about the logic of
automated decisions required by the GDPR. At the same time, linear models
also immediately highlight the relative importance of different features by
assigning a specific numerical weight to each feature, which allows
companies to quickly extract the principal factors for an adverse action notice
under ECOA.
Beyond the choice of features, learning method, or learning parameters,
there are techniques that can make simplicity an additional and explicit
optimization criterion in the learning process. The most common such
method is regularization.181 Much like setting an upper limit on the number
of branches in a decision tree, regularization allows the learning process to
factor in model complexity by assigning a cost to excess complexity.182 In
doing so, model simplicity becomes an additional objective alongside model
performance, and the learning process can be set up to find the optimal tradeoff between these sometimes-competing objectives.183
Finally, the learning process can also be constrained such that all features
exhibit monotonicity.184 Monotonicity constraints are widespread in credit
scoring because they make it easier to reason about how scores will change
when the value of specific variables change, thereby allowing creditors to
automate the process of generating the reason codes required by FCRA and
ECOA.185 As a result of these legal requirements, creditors and other data179. Id.
180. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 98.
181. See Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81–82.
182. See id. at 81. One commonly used version of this method is Lasso. See generally
Robert Tibshirani, Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso, 58 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y 267 (1996). It was originally designed to increase accuracy by avoiding overfitting,
which occurs when a model assigns significance to too many features and thus accidentally
learns patterns that are peculiar to the training data and not representative of real-world
patterns. See id. at 267. Machine learning is only effective in practice when it successfully
identifies robust patterns while also ignoring patterns that are specific to the training data. See
David J. Hand, Classifier Technology and the Illusion of Progress, 21 STAT. SCI. 1, 2 (2006).
Lasso increases accuracy by forcing the learning process to ignore relationships that are
relatively weak, and therefore more likely to be artifacts of the training data. See Tibshirani,
supra, at 268. Because Lasso works by strategically removing unnecessary features, the
technique can simultaneously improve interpretability (by reducing complexity) in many realworld applications and increase performance (by avoiding overfitting). See id. at 267. As
such, improved interpretability need not always decrease performance. But where potential
overfitting is not a danger, regularization methods may result in degradations in performance.
See Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81–82.
183. Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81.
184. Recall that monotonicity implies that an increase in an input variable can only result
in either an increase or decrease in the output; it can never change from one to the other. See
supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 120. Monotonicity allows creditors to rank order
variables according to how much the value of each variable in an applicant’s file differs from
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driven decision makers often have incentives to ensure their models are
interpretable by design.
2. Post Hoc Methods
There exists an entirely different set of techniques for improved
interpretability that does not place any constraints on the model-building
process. Instead, these techniques begin with models learned with more
complex methods and attempt to approximate them with simpler and more
readily interpretable methods. Most methods in this camp generate what can
be understood as a model of the model.
These methods attempt to overcome the fact that simpler learning methods
cannot always reliably discover as many useful relationships in the data. For
example, the learning process involved in decision trees is what is known as
a “greedy algorithm.”186 Once the learning process introduces a particular
branch, the method does not permit walking back up the branch.187
Therefore, relationships between items on two different branches will not be
discovered.188 Despite lacking the same limitation, more complex learning
methods, such as deep learning, do not result in models as interpretable as
decision trees. Nonetheless, rules that cannot be learned with simpler
methods can often be represented effectively by simpler models.189
Techniques like rule extraction190 allow simple models to “cheat” because
the answers that simpler learning methods would otherwise miss are known
ahead of time.191
This approach can be costly and it does not have universal success.192
Despite practitioners’ best efforts, replicating the performance of more
complex models in a simple enough form might not be possible where the
phenomena are particularly complex. For example, using a decision tree to
approximate a model developed with deep learning might require too large a
number of branches and leaves to be understandable in practice.193
When these methods work well, they ensure that the entire set of
relationships learned by the model can be expressed concisely, without
the corresponding value of each variable for the ideal customer—the top four variables can
function as reason codes. Id.
186. STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH
92–93 (3d ed. 2014).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 93 (noting that, although the greedy algorithm may find a nonoptimal solution,
it will not discover relationships between unrelated branches).
189. Gleicher, supra note 162, at 82.
190. Rule extraction is the name for a set of techniques used to create a simplified model
of a model. The technical details of their operation are beyond the scope of this paper. See
generally Nahla Barakat & Andrew P. Bradley, Rule Extraction from Support Vector
Machines:
A Review, 74 NEUROCOMPUTING 178 (2010); David Martens et al.,
Comprehensible Credit Scoring Models Using Rule Extraction from Support Vector
Machines, 183 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1466 (2007).
191. Gleicher, supra note 162, at 82.
192. Id.
193. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 98.
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giving up much performance. Accordingly, they serve a similar role to the
interpretability-driven design constraints discussed above.194 When they do
not work as well, arriving at an interpretable model might necessitate
sacrificing some of the performance gained by using the more complex
model. But even when these methods involve a notable loss in performance,
the resulting models frequently perform far better than simple methods
alone.195
Other tools have also emerged that attack the problem of interpretability
from a different direction. Rather than attempting to ensure that machine
learning generates an intelligible model overall, these new tools furnish more
limited explanations that only account for the relative importance of different
features in particular outcomes—similar to the reason codes required by
FCRA and ECOA.196 At a high level, most of these methods adopt a similar
approach: they attempt to establish the importance of any feature to a
particular decision by iteratively varying the value of that feature while
holding the value of other features constant.197
These tools seem well suited for the task set by ECOA, FCRA, or other
possible outcome-oriented approaches: explaining the principal reasons that
account for the specific adverse decision.198 As we further discuss in the next
section, there are several reasonable ways to explain the same specific
outcome. These methods are useful for two of the most common:
(1) determining the relative contribution of different features, or
(2) identifying the features whose values would have to change the most to
change the outcome.199 One could imagine applying these methods to
models that consider an enormous range of features and map out an
exceedingly complex set of relationships. While such methods will never
make these relationships completely sensible to a human, they can provide a
list of reasons that might help provide reason codes for a specific decision.
194. See supra Part II.B.1.
195. Johan Huysmans et al., Using Rule Extraction to Improve the Comprehensibility of
Predictive Models (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Dep’t of Decision Scis. & Info. Mgmt.,
Working
Paper
No.
0612,
2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=961358 [https://perma.cc/8AKQ-LXVE].
196. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
197. See generally Philip Adler et al., Auditing Black-Box Models for Indirect Influence,
54 KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYSTEMS 95 (2018); David Baehrens et al., How to Explain Individual
Classification Decisions, 11 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1803 (2010); Anupam Datta et al.,
Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence: Theory and Experiments with
Learning Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY & PRIVACY
598 (2016); Andreas Henelius et al., A Peek into the Black Box: Exploring Classifiers by
Randomization, 28 DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 1503 (2014); Marco Tulio
Ribeiro et al., “Why Should I Trust You?” Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 1135 (2016).
198. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
199. These methods are generally sensitive to interactions among variables and can
measure indirect as well as direct influence. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 197; Datta et al.,
supra note 197; Julius Adebayo, FairML: Auditing Black-Box Predictive Models, CLOUDERA
FAST FORWARD LABS (Mar. 9, 2017), http://blog.fastforwardlabs.com/2017/03/09/fairmlauditing-black-box-predictive-models.html [https://perma.cc/S5PK-K6GQ].
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Unfortunately, these methods may not work well in cases where models
take a much larger set of features into account. Should many features each
contribute a small amount to a particular determination, listing each feature
in an explanation is not likely to be helpful. This is the machine learning
version of Taylor’s hypothetical eight-factor credit example.200 The number
of features identified as influential might be sufficiently large that the
explanation would simply reproduce the problem of inscrutability that it aims
to address. The only alternative in these cases—arbitrarily listing fewer
reasons than the correct number—is also unsatisfying when all features are
equivalently, or nearly equivalently, important. As it happens, post hoc
explanations for credit and other similarly important decisions are likely to
be most attractive precisely when they do not seem to work well—that is,
when the only way to achieve a certain level of performance is to vastly
expand the range of features under consideration.
These methods are also unlikely to generate explanations that satisfy logiclike approaches like the GDPR. Indeed, such techniques pose a unique
danger of misleading people into believing that the reasons that account for
specific decisions must also apply in the same way for others—that the
reasons for a specific decision illustrate a general rule. Understandably,
humans tend to extrapolate from explanations of specific decisions to similar
cases, but the model—especially a complex one—may have a very different
basis for identifying similar-seeming cases.201 These methods offer
explanations that apply only to the case at hand and cannot be extrapolated
to decisions based on other input data.202
3. Interactive Approaches
One final set of approaches is interactive rather than explanatory.
Practitioners can allow people to get a feel for their models by producing
interactive interfaces that resemble the methods described in the previous
sections. This can take two quite different forms. One is the type proposed
by Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale203 and implemented, for example, by
Credit Karma.204 Beginning with a person’s baseline credit information,
Credit Karma offers a menu of potential changes, such as opening new credit
cards, obtaining a new loan, or going into foreclosure.205 A person using the
interface can see how each action would affect his credit score.206 This does
200. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
201. See Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The
Role of Explanation 3 (Harvard Univ. Berkman Klein Ctr. Working Grp. on Explanation &
the Law, Working Paper No. 18-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3064761 [https://perma.cc/SJ5S-HJ3T] (discussing the problem of cases where
similar situations lead to differing outcomes and vice versa).
202. See id.
203. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 28–30 (discussing “interactive modeling”).
204. See Credit Score Simulator, CREDIT KARMA, https://www.creditkarma.com/tools/
credit-score-simulator [https://perma.cc/XQ2S-GYUE] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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not amount to a full explanation because a person at a different starting point
could make similar moves with different outcomes, but it gives the individual
user a partial functional feel for the logic of the system as it applies to him
specifically.
The second is more complicated and abstract. Mireille Hildebrandt has
proposed something she terms “transparency-enhancing technologies.”207
Such technologies would implement an interface that would allow people to
simultaneously adjust the value of multiple features in a model with the goal
of providing a loose sense of the relationship between these features and a
specific outcome, as well as the connection between the features
themselves.208 The goal of this type of technology is not to tell the user what
changes in his results specifically but to allow him to get a feel from an
arbitrary starting point.209
Where models are simple enough, these approaches seem to achieve the
educational goals of both ECOA and the GDPR by allowing data subjects to
gain an intuitive feel for the system. Ironically, this would be accomplished
by complying with neither law because a person will not know a specific
reason for denial or have an account of a model’s logic after playing with it,
even if they feel that they understand the model better afterward.
While regulators have expressed interest in this idea,210 however, it poses
a technical challenge. The statistical relationships at work in these models
may be sufficiently complex that no consistent rule may become evident by
tinkering with adjustable sliders. Models might involve a very large number
of inputs with complex and shifting interdependencies such that even the
most systematic tinkering would generate outcomes that would be difficult
for a person to explain in a principled way.
One danger of this approach, then, is that it could do more to placate than
elucidate. People could try to make sense of variations in the observed
outputs by favoring the simplest possible explanation that accounts for the
limited set of examples generated by playing with the system. Such an
explanation is likely to take the form of a rule that incorrectly assigns a small
set of specific variables unique significance and treats their effect on the
outcome as linear, monotonic, and independent. Thus, for already simple
models that can be explained, interactive approaches may be useful for
giving people a feel without disclosing the algorithm, but for truly inscrutable
systems, they could well be dangerous.
207. Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling: From Data to Knowledge, 30 DATENSCHUTZ UND
DATENSICHERHEIT 548, 552 (2006); see also Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops, The
Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era, 73 MODERN L. REV.
428, 449 (2010). See generally NICHOLAS DIAKOPOULOS, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORTING: ON THE INVESTIGATION OF BLACK BOXES (2013), http://towcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/78524_Tow-Center-Report-WEB-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9UUWK6V].
208. See Hildebrandt & Koops, supra note 207, at 450.
209. See id.
210. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 87–88 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/
documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/J97E-N5NV].
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Remarkably, the techniques available within machine learning for
ensuring interpretability correspond well to the different types of explanation
required by existing law. There are, on the one hand, varied strategies and
techniques available to practitioners that can deliver models whose inner
workings can be expressed succinctly and sensibly to a human observer,
whether an expert (e.g., a regulator) or lay person (e.g., an affected
consumer). Laws like the GDPR that seek logic-like explanations would be
well served by these methods. On the other hand, outcome-focused laws like
ECOA that care only about principal reasons—and not the set of rules that
govern all decisions—have an obvious partner in tools that furnish post hoc
accounts of the factors that influenced any particular determination.
Where they succeed, these methods can be used to meet the demands of
regulatory regimes that demand outcome- and logic-like explanations. Both
techniques have their limitations, however. If highly sophisticated machine
learning tools continue to be used, interpretability may be difficult to achieve
in some instances, especially when the phenomena at issue are themselves
complex. Post hoc accounts that list the factors most relevant to a specific
decision may not work well when the number of relevant factors grows
beyond a handful—a situation that is most likely to occur when such methods
would be most attractive.
Notably, neither the techniques nor the laws go beyond describing the
operation of the model. Though they may help to explain why a decision was
reached or how decisions are made, they cannot address why decisions
happen to be made that way. As a result, standard approaches to explanation
might not help determine whether the particular way of making decisions is
normatively justified.
III. FROM EXPLANATION TO INTUITION
So far, the majority of discourse around understanding machine learning
models has seen the proper task as opening the black box and explaining what
is inside.211 Where Part II.A discussed legal requirements and Part II.B
discussed technical approaches, here we discuss the motivations for both.
Based on a review of the literature, scholars, technologists, and policymakers
seem to have three different beliefs about the value of opening the black
box.212 The first is a fundamental question of autonomy, dignity, and
211. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
212. These three rationales seem to track the rationales for ECOA’s adverse action notices
as described in Part II.A.1. There is also scholarship that offers a fourth rationale, which
includes due process and rule-of-law concerns. We set these concerns aside because they
pertain to government use of algorithms, while this Article focuses on regulation of the private
sector. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1288–94 (discussing “rule-of-law” principles
with respect to police and judicial actions); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by
Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147,
1184–90, 1206–09 (2017) (discussing due process and reason-giving in administrative law);
ECLT Seminars, [HUML16] 03: Katherine Strandburg, Decision-Making, Machine Learning
and the Value of Explanation, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
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personhood. The second is a more instrumental value: educating the subjects
of automated decisions about how to achieve different results. The third is a
more normative question—the idea that explaining the model will allow
people to debate whether the model’s rules are justifiable.
The black-box-only approach is limited for the purposes of justifying
decision-making. The first two beliefs are not about justifying decisions at
all, and therefore serve a different purpose. The third is explicitly about
justification, so our critique is directed not at its intent, but its operation. For
those concerned with the justification for decision-making, the goal of
explanation should be to find a way to bring intuition to bear in deciding
whether the model is well justified. This Part explains both the power and
limitations of such an approach.
A. The Value of Opening the Black Box
This Part identifies and elaborates the three rationales that apparently
underlie most of the popular and scholarly calls for explanation.
1. Explanation as Inherent Good
There are several reasons to view explanation as a good unto itself, and
perhaps a necessary part of a system constrained by law, including a respect
for autonomy, dignity, and personhood.213 There is a fundamental difference
between wanting an explanation for its own sake and wanting an explanation
for the purpose of vindicating certain specific empowerment or
accountability goals. Fears about a system that lacks explanation are visceral.
This fear is best exemplified in popular consciousness by Franz Kafka’s The
Trial,214 a story about a faceless bureaucracy that makes consequential
decisions without input or understanding from those affected.215
This concern certainly motivates some lawmakers and scholars. In his
article, “Privacy and Power,” Daniel Solove refers to this as a
“dehumanizing” state of affairs characterized by the “powerlessness and
vulnerability created by people’s lack of any meaningful form of
participation” in the decision.216 David Luban, Alan Strudler, and David
Wasserman argue that “one central aspect of the common good”—which
they argue forms the basis of law’s legitimacy—“lies in what we might call
the moral intelligibility of our lives” and that the “horror of the bureaucratic
process lies not in officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, but rather in the
watch?v=LQj3nbfSkrU [https://perma.cc/CX7S-GCUG] (discussing procedural due process
and explanations).
213. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1231, 1238–39 (1992) (explaining that while “person” usually means human being in
the law, “personhood” is a question of the attendant “bundle of rights and duties”).
214. FRANZ KAFKA, DER PROCESS (1925).
215. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (2001) (arguing that Kafka’s The Trial
is a better metaphor than George Orwell’s 1984 for modern anxieties over data).
216. Id. at 1423.
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individual’s ignorance of what the fulfillment of his or her duty may
entail.”217 The concerns of dignity and personhood certainly motivate the
data protection regime in Europe,218 if less directly the law in the United
States.219
We lack the space (and the expertise) to do proper justice to the
personhood argument for explanation. Accordingly, our goal here is to flag
it and set it aside as a concern parallel to our broader concerns about enabling
justifications for automated decisions.
To the extent that the personhood rationale can be converted to a more
actionable legal issue, it is reflected in the concept of “procedural justice,”
which was most famously championed by Tom Tyler. Procedural justice is
the essential quality of a legal system that shows respect for its participants,
which might entail transparency, consistency, or even politeness.220 Tyler
and others have shown that people care deeply about procedural justice, to
the point that they might find a proceeding more tolerable and fair if their
procedural-justice concerns are satisfied even if they do not obtain their
preferred outcome in the proceeding.221 Procedural justice, Tyler argues, is
necessary on a large scale because it allows people to buy into the legal
system and voluntarily comply with the law, both of which are essential parts
of a working and legitimate legal system.222 Presumably, to the extent that
automated decisions can be legally or morally justified, people must accept
them rather than have them imposed, and as a result, the personhood rationale
for model explanation also implicates procedural justice.
Ultimately, that there is inherent value in explanation is clear. But as a
practical matter, those concerns are difficult to administer, quantify, and
compare to other concerns. Where there are genuine trade-offs between
explanation and other normative values such as accuracy or fairness, the
inherent value of explanation neither automatically trumps competing
considerations nor provides much guidance as to the type of explanation
required. Therefore, while inherent value cannot be ignored, other rationales
remain important.

217. David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of
Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2354 (1992).
218. Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection
Directive and Automated Profiling, 17 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 17, 19 (2001); Meg
Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer
Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 223–24 (2017).
219. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1214–15 (2004).
220. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 132 (1988).
221. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 291 (2003); Tyler, supra note 220, at 128.
222. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 6–7 (2006).
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2. Explanation as Enabling Action
For others, the purpose of explanation extends to providing actionable
information about the rendering of decisions, such that affected parties can
learn if and how they might achieve a different outcome. Explanations are
valuable, on this account, because they empower people to effectively
navigate the decision-making process. Such beliefs are evident in the adverse
action notice requirements of credit-scoring regulations,223 but they have
come to dominate more recent debates about the regulatory function of
requiring explanations of model-driven decisions more generally.
Across a series of recent papers, the debate has coalesced around two
distinct, but related, questions. The first is whether and when the GDPR
requires explanations of the logic or outcome of decision-making. The
second is how to best explain outcomes in an actionable way.
The first question, whether to focus on outcome- or logic-based
explanations, originates with an article by Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt,
and Luciano Floridi.224 These scholars split explanations between “system
functionality” and “specific decisions”—a distinction functionally similar to
our outcome- and logic-based framework.225 This mirrors the debate in the
technical community about the best way to understand the meaning of
interpretability. As described in Part II.B, the main split is whether to aim
for interpretable models or to account for specific decisions. Drawing
together the legal and machine learning literature, Lilian Edwards and
Michael Veale have created a similar, but slightly altered distinction between
“model-centric” and “subject-centric” explanations.226 While not identical,
subject-centric explanations are another way to explain specific outcomes to
individuals.227
As the discussion has evolved in both the legal and computer science
scholarship, new work has converged on the belief that explaining specific
outcomes is the right approach. The debate has therefore shifted to the
223. See supra Part II.A.1.
224. Wachter et al., supra note 23.
225. Id. at 78. As Wachter and colleagues define it, system functionality is “the logic,
significance, envisaged consequences, and general functionality of an automated decisionmaking system,” and explanations of specific decisions are “the rationale, reasons, and
individual circumstances of a specific automated decision.” Id. While the distinction is
broadly useful, our definitions differ from theirs and we believe the line between outcomeand logic-based explanations is less clear than they suggest. See Selbst & Powles, supra note
90, at 239 (arguing that, given the input data, a description of the logic will provide a data
subject with the means to determine any particular outcome, and thus, explanations of the
logic will often also explain individual outcomes).
226. Edwards & Veale, supra note 143, at 55–56. They define these terms as follows:
“Model-centric explanations (MCEs) provide broad information about a [machine learning]
model which is not decision or input-data specific,” while “[s]ubject-centric explanations
(SCEs) are built on and around the basis of an input record.”
227. Ultimately, Edwards and Veale argue, as we do, that the explanation debate had been
restricted to this question. Id. Recognizing that explanations are no panacea, the rest of their
paper argues that the GDPR provides tools other than a right to explanation that could be more
useful for algorithmic accountability.
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second question, which focuses on the many different methods by which
outcomes can be explained.
An interdisciplinary working group at the Berkman Klein Center for
Internet and Society begin by recognizing that explanations are infinitely
variable in concept, but claim that “[w]hen we talk about an explanation for
a decision, . . . we generally mean the reasons or justifications for that
particular outcome, rather than a description of the decision-making process
in general.”228 They propose three ways to examine a specific decision:
(1) the main factors in a decision, (2) the minimum change required to switch
the outcome of a decision, and (3) the explanations for similar cases with
divergent outcomes or divergent cases with similar outcomes.229 Wachter,
Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell have a still narrower focus, writing about
counterfactual explanations that represent “the smallest change to the world”
that would result in a different answer.230 They envision a distance metric
where, if one were to plot all n features in an n-dimensional space, the
counterfactual is the shortest “distance” from the data subject’s point in the
space (defined by the values of the features she possesses) to the surface that
makes up the outer edge of a desirable outcome.231
Accordingly, counterfactual explanations are seen as fulfilling the three
goals of explanations discussed in this Part: (1) to help an individual
understand a decision, (2) to enable that individual to take steps to achieve a
better outcome, and (3) to provide a basis for contesting the decision.232
When applying the strategy of counterfactual explanations, however, it is
clear that most of the value comes from the second rationale: actionable
explanations. Wachter and colleagues assert that counterfactual explanations
are an improvement over the existing requirements of the GDPR because, as
a matter of positive law, the Regulation requires almost nothing except a
“meaningful overview,” which can be encapsulated via pictorial “icons”
depicting the type of data processing in question.233 Counterfactual
explanations, in contrast, offer something specific to the data subject and will
thus be more useful in informing an effective response. But if their
interpretation of the law is correct—that the GDPR requires no

228. Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 201, at 2.
229. Id. at 3.
230. Wachter et al., supra note 143, at 845.
231. Id. at 850–54. Distance metrics are a way to solve this problem. Hall and colleagues
describe another distance metric that is used in practice. Hall et al., supra note 120. They
employ a distance metric to identify the features that need to change the most to turn a credit
applicant into the ideal applicant. Id. Alternatively, other methods could be identifying the
features over which a consumer has the most control, the features that would cost a consumer
the least to change, or the features least coupled to other life outcomes and thus easier to
isolate. The main point is that the law provides no formal guidance as to the proper metric for
determining what reasons are most salient, and this part of the debate attempts to resolve this
question. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9 supp. I (2018).
232. Wachter et al., supra note 143, at 843.
233. Id. at 865.
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explanation234—then their claim is that counterfactuals offer more than
literally nothing, which is not saying much. On contestability, Wachter,
Mittelstadt, and Russell ultimately concede that to contest a decision, it is
likely necessary to understand the logic of decision-making rather than to just
have a counterfactual explanation of a specific decision.235 The real value,
then, of their intervention and others like it, is to better allow data subjects to
alter their behavior when a counterfactual suggests that a decision is based
on alterable characteristics.236
Empowering people to navigate the algorithms that affect their lives is an
important goal and has genuine value. This is a pragmatic response to a
difficult problem, but it casts the goal of explanations as something quite
limited: ensuring people know the rules of the game so they can play it better.
This approach is not oriented around asking if the basis of decisions is well
justified; rather it takes decisions as a given and seeks to allow those affected
by them to avoid or work around bad outcomes.237 Rather than using
explanations to ask about the justifications for decision-making, this
approach shifts responsibility for bad outcomes from the designers of
automated decisions to those affected by them.238
3. Explanation as Exposing a Basis for Evaluation
The final value ascribed to explanation is that it forces the basis of
decision-making into the open and thus provides a way to question the
validity and justifiability of making decisions on these grounds. As Pauline
Kim has observed:
234. The positive law debate about the right to explanation is not the subject of this Article,
but suffice it to say, there is a healthy debate about it in the literature. See supra note 143 and
accompanying text for a discussion.
235. Wachter et al., supra note 143, at 878. Their one example where a counterfactual can
lead to the ability to contest a decision is based on data being inaccurate or missing rather than
based on the inferences made. Thus, it is actually the rare situation specifically envisioned by
FCRA, where the adverse action notice reveals that a decision took inaccurate information
into account. Because of the deficiencies of the FCRA approach, discussed supra in Part II.A,
this will not solve the general problem.
236. As Berk Ustun and colleagues point out, an explanation generated by counterfactual
techniques will not necessarily be actionable unless intentionally structured to be so. Berk
Ustun et al., Actionable Recourse in Linear Classification 2 (Sept. 18, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06514 [https://perma.cc/RPJ4-P4AP].
237. Mireille Hildebrandt, Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven
Platforms, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 252, 271 (2018) (“Though it is important that decisions of
automated systems can be explained (whether ex ante or ex post; whether individually or at a
generic level), we must keep in mind that in the end what counts is whether such decisions
can be justified.”).
238. This is remarkably similar to the longstanding privacy and data protection debate
around notice and consent, where the goal of notice is to better inform consumers and data
subjects, and the assumption is that better information will lead to preferable results. See
generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1880 (2013). In reality, this often fails to protect privacy because it construes privacy
as a matter of individual decision-making that a person can choose to protect rather than
something that can be affected by others with more power. See, e.g., Roger Ford, Unilateral
Invasions of Privacy, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1075 (2016).
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When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over whether its use
is justified, but it is at least possible to have a conversation about whether
relying on the behaviors or attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively
acceptable. When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even
possible to have the conversation.239

But what does it mean to have a conversation based on what an interpretable
model reveals?
In a seminal study, Rich Caruana and colleagues provide an answer to that
question.240 They discovered that a model trained to predict complications
from pneumonia had learned to associate asthma with a reduced risk of
death.241 To anyone with a passing knowledge of asthma and pneumonia,
this result was obviously wrong. The model was trained on clinical data from
past pneumonia patients, and it turns out that patients who suffer from asthma
truly did end up with better outcomes.242 What the model missed was that
these patients regularly monitored their breathing, causing them to go to the
hospital earlier.243 Then, once at the hospital, they were considered higher
risk, so they received more immediate and focused treatment.244 Caruana
and colleagues drew a general lesson from this experience: to avoid learning
artifacts in the data, the model should be sufficiently simple that experts can
inspect the relationships uncovered to determine if they correspond with
domain knowledge. Thus, on this account, the purpose of explanation is to
permit experts to check the model against their intuition.
This approach assumes that when a model is made intelligible, experts can
assess whether the relationships uncovered by the model seem appropriate,
given their background knowledge of the phenomenon being modeled. This
was indeed the case for asthma, but this is not the general case. Often, rather
than assigning significance to features in a way that is obviously right or
wrong, a model will uncover a relationship that is simply perceived as
strange. For example, if the hospital’s data did not reveal a dependence on
an asthma diagnosis—which is clearly linked to pneumonia through
breathing—but rather revealed a dependence on skin cancer, it would be less
obvious what to make of that fact. It would be wrong to simply dismiss it as
an artifact of the data, but it also does not fit with any intuitive story even a
domain expert could tell.
Another example of this view of explanation is the approach to
interpretability known as Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations
(“LIME”).245 It has generated one of the canonical examples of the value of
239. Kim, supra note 4, at 922–23.
240. Rich Caruana et al., Intelligible Models for HealthCare: Predicting Pneumonia Risk
and Hospital 30-Day Readmission, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21TH ACM SIGKDD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 1721, 1721
(2015).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Ribeiro et al., supra note 197. This is one of the methods described supra in Part
II.B.2.
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interpretability in machine learning. Marco Ribeiro and colleagues used
LIME to investigate a deep-learning model trained to distinguish images of
wolves from huskies. The authors discovered that the model did not rely
primarily on the animals’ features, but on whether snow appeared in the
background of a photo.246
There are three reasons this is such a compelling example. First, what
LIME identified as the distinguishing feature—snow—is legible to humans.
Second, this feature is obviously not a property of the category “wolf.”
Third, humans can tell a story about why this mistake occurred: wolves are
more likely to be found in an environment with snow on the ground.
Although this story may not actually be true, the important point is that we
can convince ourselves it is.247 Like the asthma example, the ability to
determine that the model has overfit the training data relies on the inherent
legibility of the relevant feature, the existence of background knowledge
about that feature, and our ability to use the background knowledge to tell a
story about why the feature is important. In this example, the realization
relies on something closer to common sense than to specialized expertise, but
the explanation serves the same function—to allow observers to bring their
intuition to bear in evaluating the model.
The final examples come from James Grimmelmann and Daniel
Westreich,248 as well as Kim, whose work was discussed earlier.249
Grimmelmann and Westreich imagine a scenario in which a model learns to
distinguish between job applicants on the basis of a feature—musical taste—
that is both correlated with job performance and membership in a protected
class.250 They further stipulate that job performance varies by class
membership.251 As they see it, this poses the challenge of determining
whether the model, by relying on musical tastes, is in fact relying on
protected-class membership.252
Grimmelmann and Westreich then argue that if one cannot tell a story
about why musical taste correlates with job performance, the model must be
learning something else.253 They propose a default rule that the “something
else” be considered membership in a protected class unless it can be shown
246. Ribeiro et al., supra note 197, at 1142–43. This is a textbook example of overfitting
the training data.
247. In fact, while writing this section, we remembered the finding, but until we consulted
the original source we disagreed with each other about whether the wolves or huskies were
the ones pictured in snow. This suggests that the story would have been equally compelling
if the error had been reversed.
248. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75.
249. Kim, supra note 4.
250. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75, at 166–67.
251. Id. at 167.
252. The only reason a model would learn to do this is if: (1) class membership accounts
for all the variance in the outcome of interest or (2) class membership accounts for more of
the variance than the input features. In the second case, the easy fix would be to include a
richer set of features until class membership no longer communicates any useful information.
The only way that adding features could have this effect, though, is if the original model was
necessarily less than perfectly accurate, in which case a better model should have been used.
253. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75, at 174.
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otherwise, specifically by the defendant.254 The problem with this reasoning
is that the model might not be learning protected-class membership, but a
different latent variable that explains the relationship between musical taste
and job performance—an unobserved or unknown characteristic that affects
both musical taste and job performance. By assuming that it should be
possible to tell a story about such a variable if it exists, they—as in the
examples above—fail to account for the possibility of a strange, but
legitimate, result. They use the ability to tell a story as a proxy for the
legitimacy of the decision-making, but that only works if a justification, or
lack thereof, immediately falls out of the description, as it did in the asthma
and snow examples.
Kim uses a real example to make a similar point. She cites a study stating
that employees who installed web browsers that did not come with their
computers stay longer on their job.255 She then speculates that either there is
an unobserved variable that would explain the relationship or it is “entirely
coincidental.”256 To Kim, what determines whether the relationship is
“substantively meaningful” rather than a mere statistical coincidence is
Like
whether we can successfully tell ourselves such stories.257
Grimmelmann and Westreich, for Kim, if no such story can be told, and the
model has a disparate impact, it should be illegal.258 What these examples
demonstrate is that, whether one seeks to adjudicate model validity or
normative justifications, intuition actually plays the same role.
Unlike the first two values of explanation, this approach has the ultimate
goal of evaluating whether the basis of decision-making is well justified. It
does not, however, ask the question: “Why are these the rules?” Instead, it
makes two moves. The first two examples answered the question, “What are
the rules?” and expected that intuition will furnish an answer for both why
the rules are what they are and whether they are justified. The latter two
examples instead argued that decisions should be legally restricted to
intuitive relationships. Such a restriction short-circuits the need to ask why
the rules are what they are by guaranteeing up front that an answer will be
available.259

254. Id. at 173.
255. Kim, supra note 4, at 922.
256. Id. So too did the chief analytics officer in the company involved, in an interview.
Joe Pinsker, People Who Use Firefox or Chrome Are Better Employees, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/people-who-use-firefox-orchrome-are-better-employees/387781/ [https://perma.cc/3MYM-SXAQ] (“‘I think that the
fact that you took the time to install Firefox on your computer shows us something about you.
It shows that you’re someone who is an informed consumer,’ he told Freakonomics Radio.
‘You’ve made an active choice to do something that wasn’t default.’”).
257. Kim, supra note 4, at 917.
258. Id.
259. This might also explain the frequent turn to causality as a solution. Restricting the
model to causal relationships also short-circuits the need to ask the “why” question because
the causal mechanism is the answer. Ironically, a causal model need not be intuitive, so it may
not satisfy the same normative desires as intuition seems to. See supra note 78.
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These two approaches are similar, but differ in the default rule they apply
to strange cases. In the case of the two technical examples, the assumption
is that obviously flawed relationships will present themselves and should be
overruled; relationships for which there is no intuitive explanation may
remain. The two legal examples, by contrast, are more conservative. They
presume that obviously correct relationships will show themselves, so that
everything else should be discarded by default, while allowing for the
possibility of defeating such a presumption. Both are forced to rely on
default rules to handle strange, but potentially legitimate, cases because the
fundamental reliance on intuition does not give them tools to evaluate these
cases.
B. Evaluating Intuition
Much of the anxiety around inscrutable models comes from the legal
world’s demands for justifiable decision-making. That decisions based on
machine learning reflect the particular patterns in the training data cannot be
a sufficient explanation for why a decision is made the way it is. Evaluating
whether some basis for decision-making is fair, for example, will require
tools that go beyond standard technical tests of validity that would already
have been applied to the model during its development.260 While the law
gives these tests some credence, reliance on accuracy is not normatively
adequate with respect to machine learning.261
For many, the presumed solution is requiring machine learning models to
be intelligible.262 What the prior discussion demonstrates, though, is that this
presumption works on a very specific line of reasoning that is based on the
idea that with enough explanation, we can bring intuition to bear in
evaluating decision-making. As Kim observes:
Even when a model is interpretable, its meaning may not be clear. Two
variables may be strongly correlated in the data, but the existence of a
statistical relationship does not tell us if the variables are causally related,
or are influenced by some common unobservable factor, or are completely
unrelated.263

260. Even among practitioners, the interest in interpretability stems from warranted
suspicion of the power of validation; there are countless reasons why assessing the likely
performance of a model against an out-of-sample test set will fail to accurately predict a
model’s real-world performance. Yet even with these deep suspicions, practitioners still
believe in validation as the primary method by which the use of models can and should be
justified. See Hand, supra note 182, at 12–13. In contrast, the law has concerns that are
broader than real-world performance, which demand very different justifications for the basis
of decision-making encoded in machine learning models.
261. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673 (“[T]he process can result in disproportionately
adverse outcomes concentrated within historically disadvantaged groups in ways that look a
lot like discrimination.”).
262. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1253; Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra
note 75, at 173; Kim, supra note 4, at 921–22.
263. Kim, supra note 4, at 922.
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Her response is to constrain the model to features that bear an intuitive
relationship to the outcome.264
This way of thinking originates in disparate impact doctrine, which—
among several ways of describing the requirement—calls for an employment
test to have a “manifest relationship” to future job performance.265 But there
is a difference between a manifest relationship of a model to job performance
and a manifest relationship of a particular feature to job performance.
Models can be shown to have a manifest relationship to job performance if
the target variable is manifestly related to job performance and the model is
statistically valid. This is true even if none of the individual features are
manifestly related.266 People who advocate for a nexus between features and
the outcome are dissatisfied with a purely statistical test and want some other
basis to subject a model to normative assessment. Models must be restricted
to intuitive relationships, the logic goes, so that such a basis will exist.
Regulatory guidance evinces similar reasoning. In 2011, the Federal
Reserve issued formal guidance on model risk management.267 The purpose
of the document was to expand on prior guidance that was limited to model
validation.268 The guidance notes that models “may be used incorrectly or
inappropriately” and that banks need diverse methods to evaluate them
beyond statistical validation.269 Among other recommendations discussed in
Part IV, the guidance recommends “outcomes analysis,” which calls for
“expert judgment to check the intuition behind the outcomes and confirm that
the results make sense.”270
In an advisory bulletin about new financial technology, the Federal
Reserve Board recommended that individual features have a “nexus” with
creditworthiness to avoid discriminating in violation of fair lending laws.271
In their view, a nexus enables a “careful analysis” about the features assigned
264. Id.; cf. Nick Seaver, Algorithms as Culture, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2017, at 6
(“To make something [accountable] means giving it qualities that make it legible to groups of
people in specific contexts. An accountable algorithm is thus literally different from an
unaccountable one—transparency changes the practices that constitute it. For some critics,
this is precisely the point: the changes that transparency necessitates are changes that we want
to have.”).
265. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 702 (“A challenged employment practice must be
‘shown to be related to job performance,’ have a ‘manifest relationship to the employment in
question,’ be ‘demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance, bear some relationship
to job-performance ability,’ []or ‘must measure the person for the job and not the person in
the abstract.’” (quoting Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 315, 321 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)))).
266. Id. at 708.
267. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, SR LETTER 11-7, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE ON MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT (2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1107a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR
85-AASR].
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 4.
270. Id. at 13–14.
271. Evans, supra note 121, at 4.
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significance in a model predicting creditworthiness.272 Here, intuitiveness is
read into ECOA as a natural requirement of having to justify decision-making
that generates a disparate impact via the “business-necessity” defense.273
The business-necessity defense asks whether the particular decision-making
mechanism has a tight enough fit with the legitimate trait being predicted274
and whether there were equally effective but less discriminatory ways to
accomplish the same task. With a model that lacks intuitive relationships, a
plaintiff could argue that the model is indirectly—and thus poorly—
measuring some latent and more sensible variable that should serve as the
actual basis of decision-making. The Federal Reserve Board guidance
suggests that one way to avoid an uncertain result in such litigation is to limit
decision-making to features that bear an intuitive—and therefore
justifiable—relationship to the outcome of interest. While it is not clear that
relying on proxies for an unrecognized latent variable presents problems
under current disparate impact doctrine,275 the guidance treats an intuition
requirement as a prophylactic. This reasoning seems to underlie the
recommendations of Kim as well as Grimmelmann and Westreich.
What should be clear by now is that intuition is the typical bridge from
explanation to normative assessment. This can be a good thing. Intuition is
powerful. It is a ready mechanism by which considerable knowledge can be
brought to bear in evaluating machine learning models. Such models are
myopic, having visibility into only the data upon which they were trained.276
Humans, in contrast, have a wealth of insights accumulated through a broad
range of experiences, typically described as “common sense.” This
knowledge allows us to immediately identify and discount patterns that
violate our well-honed expectations and to recognize and affirm discoveries
that align with experience. In fact, intuition is so powerful that humans
cannot resist speculating about latent variables or causal mechanisms when
confronted by unexplained phenomena.
Intuition can also take the form of domain expertise, which further
strengthens the capacity to see where models may have gone awry. The
social sciences have a long history of relying on face validity to determine
whether a model is measuring what it purports to measure.277 A model that
assigns significance to variables that seem facially irrelevant is given little
credence or is subject to greater scrutiny. Such a practice might seem ad hoc,
but questioning face validity is a fundamental part of the social-scientific
272. Id.
273. It is interesting that the demand for intuitiveness, on this account, comes not from the
procedural requirements of the adverse action notices—the part of ECOA most obviously
concerned with explanations—but from the substantive concerns of disparate impact doctrine.
274. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1010 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (explaining that a business-necessity defense must be carefully tailored to
objective, relevant job qualifications).
275. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 709–10 (discussing the problems with the “fixthe-model” approach to alternative practice claims).
276. Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 87, 101 (2017).
277. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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process. Crucially, intuition allows us to generate competing explanations
that account for the observed facts and to debate their plausibility.278
Importantly, however, intuition has its downsides. Most immediately, it
can be wrong. It can lead us to discount valid models because they are
unexpected or unfamiliar, or to endorse false discoveries because they align
with existing beliefs.279 Intuition encourages us to generate “just so” stories
that appear to make good sense of the presented facts. Such stories may feel
coherent but are actually unreliable. In fact, the rich literature on cognitive
biases—including the “narrative fallacy”—is really an account of the dangers
of intuition.280 While intuition is helpful for assessing evidently good and
bad results, it is less useful when dealing with findings that do not comport
with or even run counter to experience. The overriding power of intuition
means that strange results will stand out, but intuition may not point in a
productive direction for making these any more sensible.
This is a particularly pronounced problem in the case of machine learning,
as its value lies largely in finding patterns that go well beyond human
intuition. The problem in such cases is not only that machine learning models
might depart from intuition, but that they might not even lend themselves to
hypotheses about what accounts for the models’ discoveries. Parsimonious
models lend themselves to more intuitive reasoning, but they have limits—a
complex world may require complex models. In some cases, machine
learning will have the power to detect the subtle patterns and intricate
dependencies that can better account for reality.
If the interest in explanation stems from its intrinsic or pragmatic value,
then addressing inscrutability is worthwhile for its own sake. But if we are
interested in whether models are well justified, then addressing inscrutability
only gets us part of the way. We should consider how else to justify models.
We should think outside the black box and return to the question: Why are
these the rules?
IV. DOCUMENTATION AS EXPLANATION
Limiting explanation of a model to its internal mechanics forces us to rely
on intuition to guess at why the model’s rules are what they are. But what
would it look like for regulation to directly seek an answer to that question?
By now, it is well understood that data are human constructs281 and that
subjective decisions pervade the modeling and decision-making process.282

278. See, e.g., Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19; Michael Pardo & Ronald J. Allen,
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 230 (2008).
279. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
280. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 77.
281. Lisa Gitelman & Virginia Jackson, Introduction to RAW DATA IS AN OXYMORON 1, 3
(Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013); see also danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big
Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO.,
COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 666–68 (2012).
282. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673; see also Seaver, supra note 264, at 5.
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Explaining why the model works as it does requires accounting for these
decisions.
Furnishing such answers will require process, documentation, and access
to that documentation. This can be done in a public format, with impact
assessments, or companies can do it privately, with access triggered on some
basis, like discovery in litigation.
A. The Information Needed to Evaluate Models
When we seek to evaluate the justifications for decision-making that relies
on a machine learning model, we are actually asking about the institutional
and subjective process behind its development. The Federal Reserve Board
guidance discussed in Part III.B moves in this direction by recommending
documentation, but its approach appears to be mostly about validation—how
to validate well, thoroughly, on an ongoing basis, and in preparation for a
future legal challenge.283 Careful validation is essential and nontrivial,284
but it is also not enough. Normatively evaluating decision-making requires,
at least, an understanding of: (1) the values and constraints that shape the
conceptualization of the problem, (2) how these values and constraints
inform the development of machine learning models and are ultimately
reflected in them, and (3) how the outputs of models inform final decisions.
To illustrate how each of these components work, consider credit scoring.
What are the values embedded in credit-scoring models and under what
constraints do developers operate? Lenders could attempt to achieve
different objectives with credit scoring at the outset: Credit scoring could
aim to ensure that all credit is ultimately repaid, thus minimizing default.
Lenders could use credit scoring to maximize profit. Lenders could also seek
to find ways to offer credit specifically to otherwise overlooked applicants,
as many firms engaged in alternative credit scoring seek to do. Each of these
different goals reflects different core values, but other value judgments might
be buried in the projects as well. For example, a creditor could be morally
committed to offering credit as widely as possible, while for others that does
not factor into the decision. Or a creditor’s approach to regulation could be
to either get away with as much as possible or steer far clear of regulatory
scrutiny. Each of these subjective judgments will ultimately inform the way
a project of credit scoring is conceived.
The developers of credit-scoring models will also face constraints and
trade-offs. For example, there might be limits on available talent with both
domain expertise and the necessary technical skills to build models. Models
might be better informed if there were much more data available, even though
283. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 267. The guidance wants
developers to consider where the data comes from, whether it suffers from bias, whether the
model is robust to new situations, whether due care has been taken with respect to potential
limitations and outright faults with the model, and so on. Id. at 5–16; see also Edwards &
Veale, supra note 143, at 55–56; Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 196 (2017).
284. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 680–92.
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there are practical challenges to collecting so much data. Ultimately, both
trade-offs are issues of cost,285 but they include more practical realities as
well, such as limitations on talent in the geographical area of the firm or
privacy concerns that limit the collection of more data. How to deal with
these trade-offs is a judgment call every firm will have to make.286
Another cost-related trade-off is competition. Before credit scoring was
popular, creditors used to work with borrowers over the lifetime of the loan
to ensure repayment; credit scores first took hold in banks as a way to reduce
the cost of this practice.287 Creditors today could return to that model, but it
would likely involve offering higher interest rates across the board to account
for increased operating costs, perhaps pushing such a firm out of the market.
As a result, competition operates as a constraint that ultimately changes the
decision process.
The values of and constraints faced by a firm will lead to certain choices
about how to build and use models. As we have discussed in prior work, the
subjective choices a developer makes include choosing target variables,
collecting training data, labeling examples, and choosing features.288
Developers must also make choices about other parts of the process, such as
how to treat outliers, how to partition their data for testing, what learning
algorithms to choose, and how and how much to tune the model, among other
things.289 The act of developing models is quite complex and involves many
subjective decisions by the developers.
In the credit example, the values discussed above may manifest in the
model in several ways. For example, consider the different project objectives
discussed above. If a firm seeks to maximize profit, it may employ a model
with a different target variable than a firm that seeks to minimize defaults.
The target variable is often the outcome that the model developers want to
maximize or minimize, so in the profit-seeking case, it would be expected
profit per applicant, and in the risk-based case, it could be likelihood of
default. While the alternative credit-scoring model hypothesized above
might rely on the same likelihood-of-default target variable, firms’ values are
likely to influence the type of data they collect; they might seek alternative
data sources, for example, because they are trying to reach underserved
populations. In addition to the values embedded a priori, the values of the
firms dictate how they resolve the different constraints they face—for
example, cost and competition. The traditional credit scorers tend to not
285. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 124–26
(2003).
286. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(considering costs and other burdens relevant to a discrimination case).
287. Martha Ann Poon, What Lenders See—a History of the Fair Isaac Scorecard 109, 120
(Jan. 1, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego),
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt7n1369x2/qt7n1369x2.pdf?t=o94tcd
[https://perma.cc/V24B-8G3M].
288. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 677–92.
289. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 51, at 683–700; see also Brian d’Alessandro, Cathy O’Neil
& Tom LaGatta, Conscientious Classification: A Data Scientist’s Guide to DiscriminationAware Classification, 5 BIG DATA 120, 125 (2017).
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make the extra effort or spend the extra money to obtain the data needed to
make predictions about people on the margins of society.290 There is also
regulatory uncertainty regarding the permissibility of new types of credit
data.291 Therefore, their models reflect the fact that the developers are more
sensitive to cost and regulatory penalty than inclusion.
Models are not self-executing; an additional layer of decisions concerns
the institutional process that surrounds the model. Are the model outputs
automatically accepted as the ultimate decisions?292 If not, how central is
the model to the decision? How do decision makers integrate the model into
their larger decision frameworks? How are they trained to do so? What role
does discretion play?
These questions are all external to the model, but they directly impact the
model’s importance and normative valence. For example, certain creditors
may automatically reject applicants with a predicted likelihood of default that
exceeds 50 percent.293 Others, however, may opt to be more inclusive.
Perhaps a local credit union that is more familiar with its members and has a
community-service mission might decide that human review is necessary for
applicants whose likelihood of default sits between 40 percent and
60 percent, leaving the final decision to individual loan officers. A similar
creditor might adopt a policy where applicants that the model is not able to
score with confidence are subject to human review, especially where the
outcome would otherwise be an automatic rejection of members of legally
protected classes.
Many of these high-level questions about justifying models or particular
uses of models are not about models at all, but whether certain policies are

290. Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling Techniques
in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183, 11,185 (Feb. 21, 2017).
291. Id. at 11,187–88.
292. The distinction between models and ultimate decisions is the focus of the GDPR’s
prohibition on “decision[s] based solely on automated processing.” Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, supra note 149, at 19–22 (emphasis added).
293. This is not how credit typically works in the real world, but for demonstrative
purposes, we decided to work with a single hypothetical. In reality, the best examples of this
divergence between model and use come from policing and criminal justice. For example, the
predictive-policing measure in Chicago, known as the Strategic Subject List, was used to
predict the 400 likeliest people in a year to be involved in violent crime. Monica Davey,
Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-with-data-chicago-police-try-to-predict-whomay-shoot-or-be-shot.html [https://perma.cc/TZ2T-NMEJ]. When Chicago sought funding
for the initiative, the city premised it on the idea of providing increased social services to those
400 people, but in the end only targeted them for surveillance. DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN
KOEPKE, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON “PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 9 (2016). The fairness concerns are clearly different between those use cases. See
Selbst, supra note 4, at 142–44. Similarly, COMPAS, the now-infamous recidivism risk score,
was originally designed to figure out who would need greater access to social services upon
reentry to reduce the likelihood of rearrest but is now commonly used to decide whom to
detain pending trial. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/F9CK-Z995].
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acceptable independent of whether they use machine learning.294 Questions
about justifying a model are often just questions about policy in disguise.295
For example, a predatory lender could use the exact same prediction of
default to find prime candidates in underserved communities and offer them
higher interest rates than they might otherwise receive. This will create more
profit because the underserved loan candidates will be more willing to pay a
higher rate, but it is clearly predation: interest rates are not being used to
offset risk, but to extract maximum profit from vulnerable consumers.296
Most importantly, that this practice is predatory can be judged with no
reference to the credit-scoring model.
Evaluating models in a justificatory sense means comparing the reasoning
behind the choices made by the developers against society’s broader
normative priorities, as expressed in law and policy. In order to perform this
evaluation, then, documentation about the decisions that lie behind and
become part of models must exist and be made available for scrutiny. With
an understanding of what that information looks like, the next section begins
to explore how to ensure access.
B. Providing the Necessary Information
Assuming the documentation exists, there are numerous ways it can
become open to scrutiny. For purposes of demonstration, two are discussed
here, although many more are possible:
(1) the possibility that
documentation is made publicly available from the start and (2) that it
becomes accessible upon some trigger, like litigation. The former is
essentially an algorithmic impact statement (AIS),297 a proposed variant of
the original impact statements required by the National Environmental Policy
Act.298 The most common trigger of the latter is a lawsuit, in which
documents can be obtained and scrutinized and witnesses can be deposed or
examined on the stand, but auditing requirements are another possibility. In
both approaches, the coupling of existing documentation with a way to access
it create answers to the question of what happened in the design process, with
the goal of allowing overseers to determine whether those choices were
justifiable. Like FCRA and ECOA, these examples have no inherent

294. See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY 37 (2018) (“[W]hen we focus on
programs specifically targeted at poor and working-class people, the new regime of data
analytics is more evolution than revolution. It is simply an expansion and continuation of
moralistic and punitive poverty management strategies that have been with us since the
1820s.”).
295. See, e.g., id. at 38; Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J.
59, 99–101 (2017); Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017);
Sonia Katyal, Algorithmic Civil Rights, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (draft on file
with authors); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 507–18 (2018).
296. According to sociologist Jacob Faber, this is actually what happened in the subprime
crisis to people of color. Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at
the Peak, 28 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 328, 343 (2013).
297. Selbst, supra note 4, at 169–93.
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
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connection to machine learning, but the methods can be easily applied in this
context.
An impact statement is a document designed to explain the process of
decision-making and the anticipated effects of that decision in such a way as
to open the process up to the public. Generally, the requirement is designed
to ensure that developers do their homework, create a public record, and
include public comments.299 Impact statements are an idea that originated in
1970 with the National Environmental Policy Act300 and have since been
emulated repeatedly at all levels of government, in many substantive areas of
policy.301 Aside from environmental law, the federal government requires
privacy impact assessments “when developing or procuring information
technology systems that include personally identifiable information.”302
Individual states not only have their own legislation requiring environmental
impact statements,303 but also racial impact statements for sentencing policy,
among other requirements.304 Recently, led by the ACLU’s Community
Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) initiative,305 counties and cities
have begun requiring impact statements that apply to police purchases of new
technology.306
One of us has argued that a future AIS requirement should be expressly
modeled on the environmental impact statement (EIS): the original and most
thorough version, with the fullest explanation requirements. Such an impact
statement would require thoroughly explaining the types of choices discussed
above. This includes direct choices about the model, such as target variables,
whether and how new data was collected, and what features were considered.
It also requires a discussion of the options that were considered but not
chosen, and the reasons for both.307 Those reasons would—either explicitly
or implicitly—include discussion of the practical constraints faced by the
developers and the values that drove decisions. The AIS must also discuss
the predicted impacts of both the chosen and unchosen paths, including the

299. Selbst, supra note 4, at 169.
300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347.
301. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002).
302. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decision-Making in
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008).
303. E.g., California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–
21178 (2018).
304. Jessica Erickson, Comment, Racial Impact Statements:
Considering the
Consequences of Racial Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1425, 1445 (2014).
305. AN ACT TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES WITH RESPECT TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY § 2(B) (ACLU Jan. 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/files/communitycontrol/ACLU-Local-Surveillance-TechnologyModel-City-Council-Bill-January-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ8T-3NKM] (ACLU CCOPS
Model Bill).
306. See, e.g., SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § A40-3 (2016).
307. Selbst, supra note 4, at 172–75.
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possibility of no action, and the effects of any potential mitigation
procedures.308
The typical American example of an impact statement is a public
document. Thus, a law requiring them would also require that the developers
publish the document and allow for comments between the draft and final
impact statements.309 Of course, such an idea is more palatable in the case
of regulation of public agencies. While disclosure of the kinds of information
we describe does not actually imply disclosure of the model itself—obviating
the need for a discussion of trade secrets and gaming—firms may still be
reluctant to publish an AIS that reveals operating strategy, perceived
constraints, or even embedded values. Thus, it is also useful to consider a
documentation requirement that allows the prepared documents to remain
private but available as needed for accountability.310
A provision of the GDPR actually does just this. Article 35 requires “data
protection impact assessments” (DPIAs) whenever data processing “is likely
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”311 As
Edwards and Veale discuss, the DPIA requirement is very likely to apply to
machine learning,312 and the assessments require “appropriate technical and
organizational measures” to protect data subject rights.313 In Europe, DPIAs
are private documents, though making summaries public is officially
encouraged.314 The European solution to making this private document
available is to require consultation with the member state data protection
authorities whenever the DPIA indicates a high risk of interference with data
subject rights.315
One could imagine another way of making an essentially private impact
assessment accessible, initiated by private litigation. Interrogatories,
depositions, document subpoenas, and trial testimony are all tools that enable
litigation parties to question human witnesses and examine documents.
These are all chances to directly ask model developers what choices they
made and why they made them.
A hypothetical will help clarify how these opportunities, coupled with
documentation—whether a DPIA or something similar—differ from the use
of intuition as a method of justification. Imagine a new alternative creditscoring system that relies on social media data.316 This model assigns
308. Id.
309. Id. at 177.
310. See W. Nicholson Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421,
435–37 (2017).
311. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 35.
312. Edwards & Veale, supra note 143, at 77–78.
313. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 35.
314. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk”
for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 18, WP 248 (Apr. 4, 2017).
315. Edwards & Veale, supra note 143, at 78.
316. See, e.g., Astra Taylor & Jathan Sadowski, How Companies Turn Your Facebook
Activity into a Credit Score, NATION (May 27, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/howcompanies-turn-your-facebook-activity-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/P9FW-DSTN].
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significance to data points that are unintuitive but reliably predict default.
Suppose the model also evinces a disparate impact along racial lines, as
revealed by investigative journalists.
Black applicants denied credit then bring suit under the substantive
nondiscrimination provisions of ECOA. Assuming, reasonably, that the
judge agrees that disparate impact is a viable theory under ECOA,317 the case
will turn on the business-necessity defense. Thus, in order to determine
whether there was a legal violation, it is necessary to know why the designer
of the model proceeded in using the particular features from social media and
whether there were equally effective alternatives with less disparate impact.
Under an intuition-driven regime, such as that proposed by either Kim or
Grimmelmann and Westreich, the case would begin with a finding of prima
facie disparate impact, and then, to evaluate the business-necessity defense,
the plaintiffs might put the lead engineer on the stand. The attorney would
ask why social media data was related to the ultimate judgment of
creditworthiness. The engineer would respond that the model showed they
were related: “the data says so.” She is not able to give a better answer
because the social media data has no intuitive link to creditworthiness.318
Under their proposed regime, the inquiry would end. The defendant has not
satisfied its burden and would be held liable.319
Under a regime of mandated documentation and looking beyond the logic
of the model, other explanations could be used in the model’s defense.
Rather than be required to intuitively link the social media data to the
creditworthiness, the engineer would be permitted to answer why the model
relies on the social media data in the first place. The documentation might
show, or the engineer might testify, that her team tested the model with and
without the social media data and found that using the data reduced the
disproportionate impact of the model.320 Alternatively, the documentation
might demonstrate that the team considered more intuitive features that
guaranteed similar model performance but discovered that such features were
exceedingly difficult or costly to measure. The company then used social
media data because it improved performance and reduced disparate impact
under the practical constraints faced by the company.

317. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. 2012-04 (FAIR LENDING), LENDING
DISCRIMINATION 2 (2012), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_bulletin_
lending_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/M42R-W9J7].
318. The engineer might have been able to come up with a story for why social media
relates to credit—perhaps many of the applicant’s friends have low credit scores and the
operating theory is that people associate with others who have similar qualities—and under
this regime, such a story might have satisfied the defense. But the engineer knows this is a
post hoc explanation that may bear little relationship to the actual dynamic that explains the
model.
319. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75, at 170.
320. In fact, a recent Request for Information by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
seems to anticipate such a claim. Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data
and Modeling Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183, 11,185–86 (Feb. 21,
2017).

2018]

EXPLAINABLE MACHINES

1137

These justifications are not self-evidently sufficient to approve of the
credit model in this hypothetical. Certainly, reducing disparate impact seems
like a worthwhile goal. In fact, prohibiting or discouraging decision makers
from using unintuitive models that exhibit any disparate impact may have the
perverse effect of maintaining a disparate impact. Cost is a more difficult
normative line321 and would likely require a case-by-case analysis. While
intuition-based evaluation—and its reliance on default rules—would forbid
the consideration of either of these motivations for using social media data,
both rationales should at least enter into the discussion.322
Having to account for all the decisions made in the process of project
inception and model development should reveal subjective judgments that
can and should be evaluated. This kind of explanation is particularly useful
where intuition fails. In most cases, these decisions would not be
immediately readable from the model.323 Recall that intuition is most useful
where explanations of a model reveal obviously good or bad reasons for
decision-making but will often offer no help to evaluate a strange result.
Documentation will help because it provides a different way of connecting
the model to normative concerns. In cases where the individual features are
not intuitively related to the outcome of interest but there is an obviously
good or bad reason to use them anyway, documentation will reveal those
reasons where explanation of the model will not. Accordingly, these highlevel explanations are a necessary complement to any explanation of the
internals of the model.
Documentation will not, however, solve every problem. Even with
documentation, some models will both defy intuition and resist normative
clarity. Regardless, a regime of documentation leaves open the possibility of
developing other ways of asking whether this was a well-executed project,
including future understanding of what constitutes best practice. As common
flaws become known, checking for them becomes simply a matter of being
responsible. A safe harbor or negligence-based oversight regime may
emerge or become attractive as the types of choices faced by firms become
known and standardized.324 Documentation of the decisions made will be
necessary to developing such a regime.

321. See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment
Discrimination Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2006).
322. Documentation provides a further benefit unrelated to explanation. If the requirement
for an intuitive link is satisfied, then the case moves to the alternative practice prong, which
looks to determine whether there was another model the creditor “refuses” to use. Cf. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). Normally, a “fix-the-model” response will not be
persuasive because it is difficult to tell exactly how it went wrong, and what alternatives the
developers had. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 705. With documentation, the alternatives
will be plainly visible because that is exactly what has been documented.
323. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 715.
324. See generally William Smart, Cindy Grimm & Woody Hartzog, An Education Theory
of Fault for Autonomous Systems (Mar. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.werobot2017.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Smart-Grimm-HartzogEducation-We-Robot.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJM-4ZQH].
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While there will certainly still be strange results for which neither intuition
nor documentation works today, the overall set of cases we cannot evaluate
will shrink considerably with documentation available.
CONCLUSION
Daniel Kahneman has referred to the human mind as a “machine for
jumping to conclusions.”325 Intuition is a basic component of human
reasoning, and reasoning about the law is no different. It should therefore
not be surprising that we are suspicious of strange relationships in models
that admit no intuitive explanation at all. The natural inclination at this point
is to regulate machine learning such that its outputs comport with intuition.
This has led to calls for regulation by explanation. Inscrutability is the
property of machine learning models that is seen as the problem, and the
target of the majority of proposed remedies. The legal and technical work
addressing the problem of inscrutability has been motivated by different
beliefs about the utility of explanations: inherent value, enabling action, and
providing a way to evaluate the basis of decision-making. While the first two
rationales may have their own merits, the law has more substantial and
concrete concerns that must be addressed. Those who believe solving
inscrutability provides a path to normative evaluation also fall short because
they fail to recognize the role of intuition.
Solving inscrutability is a necessary step, but the limitations of intuition
will prevent normative assessment in many cases. Where intuition fails, the
task should be to find new ways to regulate machine learning so that it
remains accountable. Otherwise, maintaining an affirmative requirement for
intuitive relationships will potentially impede discoveries and opportunities
that machine learning can offer, including those that would reduce bias and
discrimination.
Just as restricting evaluation to intuition will be costly, so would
abandoning it entirely. Intuition serves as an important check that cannot be
provided by quantitative modes of validation. But while there will always be
a role for intuition, we will not always be able to use it to bypass the question
of why the rules are the rules. We need the developers to show their work.
Documentation can relate the subjective choices involved in applying
machine learning to the normative goals of substantive law. Much of the
discussion surrounding models implicates important policy discussions, but
does so indirectly. Often, when models are employed to change a way of
making decisions, too much focus is placed on the technology itself instead
of the policy changes that either led to the adoption of the technology or were
wrought by its adoption.326 Quite aside from correcting one failure mode of
intuition, documentation has a separate worth in laying bare the kinds of
value judgments that go into designing these systems and allowing society to
engage in a clearer normative debate in the future.
325. KAHNEMAN, supra note 77, at 185.
326. See generally EUBANKS, supra note 294.
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We cannot and should not abandon intuition. But only by recognizing the
role intuition plays in our normative reasoning can we recognize that there
are other ways. To complement intuition, we need to ask whether people
have made reasonable judgments about competing values under their realworld constraints. Only humans can answer these questions.

